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What Is Judicial Ideology, and  
How Should We Measure It? 
Joshua B. Fischman∗  
David S. Law∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
It has become de rigueur for leading law schools to profess great 
enthusiasm for both interdisciplinary and empirical research. Yet not 
all work in this vein has been warmly embraced. There remains deep 
skepticism in legal circles toward interdisciplinary empirical 
scholarship aimed at capturing the impact of ideology on judicial 
behavior. Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit, a vocal critic of 
this body of work, has vigorously disputed that “‘ideology’ broadly 
influences decision making.”1 The “disciples” of what he calls the 
“political view,” he writes, “seem determined to characterize judges 
as knee-jerk ideologues, who act pursuant to a blind adherence to 
ideological precepts and decide cases wholly without regard to the 
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 1. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 1335, 1336 (1998). 
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law.”2 “Political scientists who study the Supreme Court do not take 
legal doctrine very seriously,” charges Michael Dorf, a prominent 
constitutional scholar.3 In suggesting that ideology influences the 
behavior of the Justices, he argues, political scientists have been 
guilty of “dispens[ing] with the metaphysical nonsense of law as a 
category independent of values, ideology and preferences, at least in 
the sorts of hard cases that reach the Supreme Court.”4 Brian 
Tamanaha, a leading legal theorist, is no more generous in his 
assessment: “The judicial politics field,” he charges, “was born in a 
congeries of false beliefs that have warped its orientation and 
development,” and it remains characterized by “a distorting slant” 
that leads scholars “to exaggerate the influence of politics in 
judging.”5 
Has empirical research on the influence of judicial ideology gone 
awry? If so, how? To be sure, the fault may not lie entirely with the 
literature itself. To some extent, there exists a straightforward 
problem of “unfortunate,” and innocent, “interdisciplinary 
ignorance.”6 It is understandably difficult for legal scholars and 
judges to navigate and evaluate a body of literature that, although 
relevant, tends to be disseminated through unfamiliar channels and 
can often be highly technical.7 There is also little reason to expect 
those who practice or teach the craft of legal argument to embrace a 
body of research that questions the extent to which judicial decision-
making is actually driven by legal argument.8 Empirical work that 
portrays ideology as an important determinant of judicial behavior 
 
 2. Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: 
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 625 (1985). 
 3. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox Is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 
21 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 497, 498 (2007). 
 4. Id. at 499. 
 5. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant of Quantitative Studies of Judging 4 (St. 
John’s Univ. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 08-0159, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1292459; see also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-
REALIST DIVIDE ON JUDGING: HISTORY, POLITICAL SCIENCE, THEORY (forthcoming 2009). 
 6. See generally Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of 
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251 (1997). 
 7. Cf. id. at 254 (observing that “legal scholars may ignore political science research 
because it is inconvenient”). 
 8. See id. (noting that lawyers have a “considerable financial stake in perpetuating” the 
belief that legal doctrine explains how judges decide cases). 
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breaches the wall of separation between law and politics that legal 
scholars have labored mightily for decades to erect and defend.9 If 
legal and political decision-making come to be seen as largely 
undifferentiated, it becomes unclear why judges should pay any 
special heed to legal as opposed to policy arguments; nor, for that 
matter, does it remain obvious why certain questions should be 
resolved in the courts rather than in the arena of ordinary politics. 
Breaches in the wall between law and politics therefore threaten to 
diminish both the range of policy questions over which legal scholars 
may attempt to claim special expertise and the extent of the influence 
that they have over the determination of those questions. 
But skepticism of the empirical literature on judicial ideology 
cannot be wholly dismissed as the product of ignorance or self-
interest on the part of the audience. Without seeking to deny that 
ideology plays a significant role in judicial decision-making, well-
informed observers have nevertheless raised reasonable criticisms 
about the manner in which empirical scholars have tackled the 
subject.10 Critics of the empirical social science literature on judicial 
behavior have reason for concern, in particular, about the manner in 
which researchers have sought to measure judicial ideology. 
Empirical studies routinely purport to measure ideology without 
specifying what is meant by “ideology,” or taking care to measure 
“ideology” in a way that will not invite a host of objections. Given 
the skepticism of legal scholars toward this line of research, however, 
it is incumbent upon those of us who investigate judicial ideology to 
employ concepts and methods that are both clear and appropriate. 
The fact that much of the audience is not methodologically 
 
 9. See, e.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION [FIN DE SIÈCLE] 14, 23–
38 (1997) (arguing that legal and political discourse deny the extent to which the ideological 
tendencies of judges resolve legal questions, and critiquing the traditional view that 
adjudication, unlike legislation, “need not be political”). 
 10. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POL. 261, 262 
(2006) (admonishing political scientists for exhibiting “an almost pathological skepticism that 
law matters” and for failing “to take law and legal institutions seriously”); Patricia M. Wald, A 
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 239–40, 250 (1999) (acknowledging 
freely that “judges do have personal ideologies which sometimes enter into their 
decisionmaking,” and questioning whether that fact can be “legitimately labeled a problem” at 
all, yet also deeming it “extremely problematic” to assume, as scholars have sometimes 
appeared to do, “that judges intentionally act in alignment with the party from which they 
sprung”). 
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sophisticated makes it all the more crucial that we do so. As a 
research community, we must cultivate and convey a better 
understanding of methods for measuring judicial ideology if we are to 
succeed in convincing others of the validity of our work. 
Empirical scholarship on the subject of judicial ideology is 
vulnerable to two sets of difficulties, which tend to blend into one 
another. The first set is theoretical; the second set is methodological. 
Both will be surveyed here. Part I of this Article explores the 
theoretical problem that scholars use the term “judicial ideology” in 
the absence of any widespread agreement or clear understanding as to 
what the term means in the first place. It is difficult for scholars to 
devise appropriate and broadly acceptable measures of judicial 
ideology when they and their readers have different concepts—or 
perhaps no coherent concept at all—of “judicial ideology” in mind. 
As a result, bona fide intellectual disagreement over the nature of 
judicial behavior is too easily compounded by outright 
misunderstanding. Part II discusses three of the most significant and 
common practical obstacles to the measurement of judicial ideology. 
First, ideology is not a tangible phenomenon that can be directly 
observed. Second, judicial behavior is often open to multiple 
interpretations. Third, judicial ideology may be a multidimensional 
phenomenon, such that a judge who is liberal in one context may be 
moderate or conservative in another, or the labels “liberal,” 
“moderate,” and “conservative” may not seem applicable at all. 
Parts III and IV of this Article aim to address an important 
practical need of judicial behavior scholars. There are several ways in 
which one can measure judicial ideology, but little has been written 
about how researchers should go about choosing among these 
methods. Competing considerations of accuracy, convenience, and 
ease of interpretation make it difficult to know what measurement 
approach is most appropriate to the task at hand. In Part III, we 
identify and discuss the relative merits of three popular approaches: 
the use of proxy measures, the assessment of judicial ideology based 
on the actual behavior of the judges in a particular context, and the 
transplantation of ideology measures developed in one context into 
other contexts involving partly or wholly different data.  
Finally, in Part IV, we compare the real-world performance of 
different measurement approaches, using data drawn from the federal 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/7
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courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. Our comparisons establish 
that efforts to estimate the impact of ideology on judicial behavior 
can yield significantly different results depending upon how one 
chooses to measure ideology. Ultimately, there is no panacea for the 
many challenges involved in identifying a viable and appropriate 
measure of judicial ideology for the research question at hand. In 
light of their superior performance in our tests, however, we believe 
that ideology measures derived from the actual behavior of judges 
may deserve more serious attention and wider usage than they have 
thus far received, particularly as compared to the proxy measures that 
remain popular among scholars. 
I. THEORETICAL CHALLENGES 
Scholars have used the term “ideology” in a bewildering variety 
of ways, often without even attempting to define it.11 The result is 
that ideology is in the eye of the beholder: what one observer might 
call ideological behavior, another might call principled judging, and 
vice versa. An ideology is, in a literal sense, a collection or system of 
ideas. The Oxford English Dictionary offers four definitions of the 
term, only one of which corresponds to the sense in which legal 
scholars and social scientists use the term in connection with judicial 
behavior: “ideology” refers, in this sense, to “[a] systematic scheme 
of ideas, usu[ally] relating to politics or society, or to the conduct of a 
class or group, and regarded as justifying actions, esp[ecially] one 
that is held implicitly or adopted as a whole and maintained 
regardless of the course of events.”12  
 
 11. See, e.g., Philip E. Converse, The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics, in 
IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT 206, 207 (David Apter ed., 1964) (observing, a quarter century 
ago, that the term “ideology” had already been muddled by diverse uses, “and opting therefore 
to employ the term “belief system” instead); Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We 
Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naïve Legal Realism, 83 ST. JOHN’S L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
1264174 (noting that “rarely does judicial politics scholarship pause to investigate what it 
means by ideology”); David W. Minar, Ideology and Political Behavior, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. 
SCI. 317, 320–26 (1961) (discussing and comparing the most prominent ways in which the term 
“ideology” has been employed in social science). 
 12. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989), http://dictionary.oed.com; see also, 
e.g., Minar, supra note 11, at 320–26 (reviewing various conceptions of ideology that have been 
commonly used by social scientists). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:133 
 
 
Defined in this manner, however, “ideology” is not amenable to 
empirical research.13 With the tools and data that currently exist, 
there is simply no way for researchers to observe directly a judge’s 
actual state of mind.14 As a result, studies that purport to measure 
“judicial ideology” have not sought to ascertain the structure or 
content of the ideas that judges hold. In practice, they have aimed 
instead to measure the extent to which judges behave in a way that 
appears motivated by preference or beliefs of an ideological 
character. Yet this orientation of the literature toward observable 
behavior, as opposed to unobservable states of mind, still begs the 
question of what it means for a judge to behave “ideologically.”  
Even in the relatively specific context of empirical research on 
judicial behavior, there is an array of different phenomena that people 
may have in mind when using the term. It might be considered 
“ideological,” for example, for judges to seek to advance a particular 
policy outcome—a world characterized by less environmental 
degradation, or of less regulation, or of greater or lesser levels of 
immigration. Alternatively, the term “ideological” could describe a 
tendency to favor or disfavor certain types of parties—criminal 
defendants, police officers, corporations, members of ethnic or 
religious minorities, the disabled, and so forth. Indeed, the breadth of 
the concept of “ideology” even makes it possible to speak of the 
existence of both political ideology and legal ideology. To say that a 
certain type of judicial behavior is “ideological” need not mean that it 
is ideological in a political sense: one might, for example, 
characterize adjudication that relies heavily upon logical deduction 
from formal rules as narrowly “legal,” whereas adjudication driven 
by ideas about the role of law and the responsibilities of judges might 
by contrast be characterized as both “legal” and “ideological” in 
character.  
The existing literature, however, tends to equate judicial ideology 
with political orientation, and to distinguish sharply between political 
 
 13. See Minar, supra note 11, at 320 (noting that efforts to study the relationship between 
ideology and political behavior are complicated in part by tensions between the way in which 
the term has traditionally been used and “the requirements of scientific explanation”).  
 14. See infra Part II.A (discussing the methodological challenge that a psychological 
phenomenon such as the ideology of a judge cannot be directly observed using currently 
available techniques). 
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and ideological motivations, on the one hand, and legal motivations, 
on the other. The idea that “politics” and “ideology” are synonymous, 
and that “law” and “ideology” are opposites, forms the basis of the 
theoretical framework articulated by Professors Segal and Spaeth, 
who assign explanations of judicial decision-making to one of three 
models: the “legal model,” the “attitudinal model,” and the 
“strategic” or “rational choice model.”15 The “attitudinal model,” of 
which they are the chief proponents,16 equates “the ideological 
attitudes and values of the justices” with their political leanings.17 As 
they use the term, ideology refers simply to the political leanings of 
the Justices.18 What they call the “legal model,” by contrast, depicts 
judicial decision-making as the product of the interplay of law and 
fact.19 
This distinction between the “legal” and the “political” or 
“ideological” is deeply problematic. To take a concrete example, 
Justice Scalia has articulated at length a set of reasons for favoring 
adherence to the original meaning of the text as a method of statutory 
and constitutional interpretation.20 Most legal and political observers 
alike would conclude that it is appropriate, if not desirable, for him to 
adopt an interpretive method, or “judicial philosophy,” in light of his 
responsibilities as a judge. Yet that is not to say that his choice of 
originalism is neither “ideological” nor “political” in character. First, 
it is possible that he has given an incomplete account of his reasons 
for choosing a particular judicial philosophy. Might it be that his 
 
 15. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002) (contrasting the “attitudinal” model with the “legal” 
and “rational choice” models); see also, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19–56 
(2008) (identifying nine theories of judicial behavior, including the “attitudinal,” “strategic,” 
and “legalist” theories). 
 16. See FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE 
COLLEGIAL GAME 10–13 (2000) (implying that Professors Segal and Spaeth may not be in the 
mainstream of judicial politics research insofar as they reject the position that strategic 
considerations influence the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices). 
 17. “[T]he Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the 
ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does 
because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely 
liberal.” SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15, at 86. 
 18. See id. 
 19. See id. at 48. 
 20. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 9–25, 37–47 (1997). 
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choice is instrumental and motivated in part by a belief that 
originalism tends to yield conservative results?21 Second, even if we 
assume that he has given a complete account of his reasons for 
employing originalism, the fact that his choice of originalism is 
principled does not necessarily remove it from the realm of ideology: 
there is nothing contradictory about the notion of a principled 
ideologue. Third, the principles underlying his commitment to 
originalism might themselves be considered both “political” and 
“ideological.” Why is Justice Scalia’s conception of the proper role 
of judges in a democracy, and of the demands of the rule of law, not a 
“political” view? If he decides cases on the basis of his commitment 
to originalism, are we to say that his behavior is legally motivated, 
ideologically motivated, or both?  
There are other ways in which judicial behavior may resist easy 
categorization as either “legal” or “ideological,” such that one label 
applies to the exclusion of the other. Law and ideology are not, in 
fact, mutually exclusive categories: the “law” may explicitly give 
room for a judge’s “ideology” to operate, while a judge’s “ideology” 
may include a preference for following the law. Consider, for 
example, the fact that judges are frequently directed by law to 
exercise what is known as “discretion.”22 A grant of discretion 
implies that judges are free, within the legally defined bounds of their 
discretion, to reach varying results on the basis of whatever 
considerations they happen to deem relevant or appropriate. Thus, a 
judge who consistently exercises her discretion in a conservative 
direction is, in a sense, behaving ideologically, yet she is not 
behaving in a manner inconsistent with law.23 Her behavior is both 
legally and ideologically driven: to the extent that the relevant legal 
criteria provide no further guidance, the law permits, if not invites, 
her to behave ideologically. 
 
 21. See Sara C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 113 (2009); Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A 
Positive Theory of Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 805 (2008) (arguing that 
a “results-oriented judge” will select the interpretive theory that tends to produce the 
substantive results he or she prefers and that “observing, say, textualist decisions in the world 
may tell us more about textualists than it tells us about textualism”). 
 22. See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408–26 (2007). 
 23. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 15, at 41–49; Kim, supra note 22, at 408–17. 
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To be sure, it is possible for judges to exercise discretion in a 
nonideological manner. But it is also possible for judges to exercise 
discretion in an ideological manner while remaining entirely faithful 
to law. Judges themselves find it uncontroversial that there are hard 
cases in which the law gives out, and in which they therefore can and 
do draw upon their personal views and preferences rather than choose 
arbitrarily.24 They can and do disagree, of course, over the extent to 
which they have discretion, and that disagreement itself can be 
ideologically motivated. But to the extent that judges are operating 
within an area of true discretion, their reliance upon ideological 
considerations is neither contrary to, nor to the exclusion of, what the 
law demands. 
Because the concept of “judicial ideology” relies upon an 
inherently murky and confused distinction between what is “legal” 
and what is “ideological” or “political,” its use is bound to provoke 
disagreement between those who regard a particular form of judicial 
behavior to be “political” or “ideological” in character, and those 
who consider the same behavior to be “legal” in character. In cases of 
such disagreement, legal scholars can be expected to resist the use of 
the term “ideological” by political scientists to describe the behavior 
in question.  
It is not possible for this Article to settle the correct meaning of 
the term “ideology.” How researchers should or will use the term will 
inevitably depend upon the purposes that they have in mind. Our 
purpose here has been instead to highlight both the inherent difficulty 
of defining the term in a coherent and satisfying way, and the 
resulting risk that empirical research on the subject will be 
misunderstood or rejected. Different audiences may interpret the term 
 
 24. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16–17, 66 
(1949) (arguing that the “method of free decision” is “dominant” in constitutional adjudication, 
and that judges are required to reach decisions that advance social welfare); POSNER, supra note 
15, at 78–92, 102 (describing appellate judges as “occasional legislators” who are influenced by 
their “political leanings” when deciding “legalistically indeterminate” cases); Edwards, supra 
note 2, at 622 (acknowledging that “there are certain sorts of cases in which a judge’s moral and 
political views unavoidably come into play”); Wald, supra note 10, at 250–51 (“[J]udges do 
have personal ideologies which sometimes enter into their decisionmaking. But how could it be 
otherwise? [W]hen a judge is presented with . . . a ‘very hard’ case . . . that judge must use her 
discretion to reach what she feels is the most appropriate and accurate result. [T]hat decision 
must necessarily be shaded by the judge’s experience and beliefs.”). 
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differently. It thus behooves scholars to specify as clearly as possible 
what they are choosing to study. 
In practice, empirical researchers tend to use the term “ideology” 
to describe a judge’s predisposition to decide certain types of cases in 
particular way. They do so on the implicit assumption that the basis 
of this predisposition is an “ideology” in the dictionary sense of the 
word—namely, a set of related ideas, preferences, or beliefs that are 
at least arguably political in character. As we discuss below, 
however, there is ordinarily no way for empirical scholars to know 
for certain whether this assumption holds true.25 Our own use of the 
term “ideology” in this Article varies, as it must, with the context of 
the discussion. For the purpose of discussing in Part II why 
“ideology” is inherently difficult to measure, we use the term in its 
dictionary sense, which constitutes some kind of unattainable ideal. 
For the purposes of describing and evaluating in Parts III and IV the 
ways in which scholars have in fact sought to measure ideology, by 
contrast, we use the term in the less demanding sense that has been 
employed by other empirical scholars.  
II. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
Problems of definition breed problems of measurement. We 
cannot know what data we must collect, and what methods we should 
apply, if we do not first specify what it is that we are attempting to 
measure. If scholars do not know what they mean by “ideology,” they 
cannot hope to select the most appropriate way to measure it. 
Likewise, if scholars fail to specify what they mean by ideology, it 
becomes impossible for the audience to judge the appropriateness of 
the measures used.  
The question of how judicial ideology should be defined can only 
be answered in light of why we care about judicial ideology in the 
first place and what our research goals happen to be. Is the goal, for 
example, to predict the likelihood that a given judge will arrive at 
decisions that are pleasing to conservatives? Are we interested in the 
 
 25. See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the inherent unobservability of a person’s ideology, 
in its dictionary sense, and the simultaneous necessity and difficulty of drawing inferences 
about a judge’s “ideology” from his or her observable behavior). 
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extent to which case outcomes depend on the identity of the judge or 
the composition of the panel? In either case, it may not be necessary 
to impute motivations to the judge at all. Is the goal instead to 
measure the ideology of the judge? If so, it will be necessary to 
define “ideology.” Or is the goal not only to measure the judge’s 
ideology, but also the extent to which that ideology influences the 
judge’s decision-making? If so, it will be necessary not only to define 
judicial ideology, but also to distinguish the effect of “ideological” 
factors from the effect of all “nonideological” factors. Is the goal to 
measure whether the judge is influenced at all by ideology? Or is the 
goal to measure the extent to which the judge is influenced by 
ideological considerations to the detriment of legal considerations? If 
it is the former, then it will be appropriate to analyze all cases in 
which the judge exercises discretion; if it is the latter, then it will be 
necessary to identify and analyze only those cases in which the judge 
exceeds the bounds of his or her discretion for ideological reasons. 
There are subtle, but important, substantive differences among these 
various research goals. Only after we have specified our research 
goals can we attempt to identify the definitional and measurement 
approaches that best advance those goals. 
Even if one arrives at an explicit and goal-appropriate definition 
of “ideology,” however, obstacles to proper measurement abound. 
Three such obstacles will be discussed here: (1) the fact that judicial 
ideology is a latent trait that cannot be directly observed, with the 
result that we must rely upon inferences drawn from observable 
behaviors; (2) the problem of observational equivalence; and (3) the 
multidimensionality of judicial ideology. 
A. The Inherent Unobservability of Ideology 
What does it mean to say that ideology is a latent trait? Unlike a 
person’s age or sex, a person’s ideology cannot be directly observed. 
Indeed, it cannot be proven that “ideology” even exists in the form 
that scholars posit. The day may eventually arrive when it becomes 
possible, via functional magnetic resonance imaging or some 
analogous technology, to identify and label a phenomenon called 
“ideology” at work in the brain of a judge. Until that day arrives, 
however, the human mind remains largely a black box. Absent the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ability to peer inside a judge’s mind and observe a thing called 
“ideology” at work, the only way to measure “ideology” is to focus 
upon some observable trait or behavior that is correlated with, or 
indicative of, ideology. 
Suppose, for example, that an empirical researcher wishes to 
measure David’s liking for tofu. A taste for tofu is, like political 
ideology, a latent trait that cannot be directly observed. There are two 
approaches that the researcher might take to ascertain the extent to 
which he likes tofu. The first approach would be for the researcher to 
use some observable trait as a proxy for his unobservable attitude 
toward tofu. For example, the researcher might seize upon the fact 
that inhabitants of St. Louis consume less tofu per capita than 
inhabitants of Tokyo. His city of residence, unlike his state of mind 
toward tofu, is observable. Having observed that David lives in St. 
Louis and not Tokyo, the researcher might conclude that he does not 
like tofu.  
The drawbacks to the use of this crude geographical proxy for 
food preference are obvious. Although the proxy may rest upon a 
generalization that tends on the whole to be true—namely, people in 
St. Louis consume relatively less tofu because they like it less—there 
is no guarantee that the generalization holds true in the specific case 
of David. Moreover, even if one observable characteristic indicates 
that he is not a likely tofu-lover, other observable traits—such as the 
facts that he is ethnically Asian and has lived in California—may 
suggest the opposite. Given a certain amount of information about 
both the shared observable traits of people who enjoy tofu and the 
extent to which David possesses those traits, the researcher’s 
response might be to construct a model that employs a range of 
variables—including not only David’s current place of residence, but 
also his ethnicity, his gender, his party affiliation, his age, his 
educational level, the number of years that he has lived in heavily 
urban areas with a high Asian population, and so forth—to predict the 
likelihood that he will like tofu. Ultimately, however, any conclusion 
that the researcher reaches concerning David’s taste for tofu will be a 
prediction based on generalizations about the taste of other people 
who share certain characteristics with him. 
The second approach that the researcher might take would be to 
look for observable behavior that is consistent or inconsistent with a 
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taste for tofu. Self-reporting is one form of observable behavior: the 
researcher might simply ask David how he feels about tofu. But self-
reporting is not necessarily a reliable source of information about his 
tastes. He might lie because he wants the researcher to believe that he 
is a healthy eater, or because he fears that his friends and neighbors 
will ridicule him for professing a penchant for tofu. Or he might 
simply lack the time or inclination to complete a questionnaire or 
interview on the subject of his dietary preferences.  
Knowing this, the clever researcher might attempt to monitor his 
actual food-purchasing habits. She might keep track of how much 
tofu he buys at the supermarket, for example, by obtaining the data 
that the supermarket collects about his purchases as part of its 
customer loyalty program. Such an approach would allow her to 
observe not only how frequently David buys tofu from that 
supermarket, and how much, but also whether he buys more when it 
is on sale, whether there are other foods that he substitutes for tofu 
depending upon their prices relative to one another, and so forth. This 
approach of observing actual behavior that might be expected to 
reveal his attitude toward tofu has a great advantage over the use of 
proxy variables: the researcher can avoid relying upon 
generalizations about the dietary preferences of people who share 
certain characteristics with David. Such generalizations are bound to 
be inaccurate in many cases, and the researcher who relies upon them 
has no way of knowing whether someone happens to be an exception. 
A behavioral assessment of dietary preferences, based upon 
observation of actual choices that a person makes, promises to 
capture individual-level variation in a way that proxy measures such 
as place of residence and ethnicity cannot hope to do.  
B. The Problem of Observational Equivalence 
All other things being equal, individualized measurement of latent 
traits on the basis of observable behavior may be preferable to 
reliance upon inherently inaccurate proxy measures. Even this 
approach, however, is not foolproof. A major obstacle to the 
behavioral assessment of latent traits stems from the fact that, by 
definition, latent traits such as a preference for tofu or a conservative 
political ideology cannot be directly observed. Researchers can only 
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draw inferences about their existence and magnitude from observable 
behavior, and often, there is more than one inference that can be 
drawn from the same act. Observable behavior is frequently open to 
multiple interpretations that are compatible with different 
explanations of the behavior in question. 
Suppose, for example, that our intrepid researcher observes that 
David never includes tofu in his grocery purchases. It would be 
reasonable to infer from this behavior that he dislikes tofu. But there 
are other possible explanations. Perhaps he orders tofu in restaurants 
but does not cook it at home, or he prefers to buy his tofu from a 
specialty grocery store about which the researcher lacks information. 
Or perhaps his partner detests tofu, and he is wary of choosing foods 
that she will not want to share. Ideally, a researcher would 
acknowledge all plausible competing explanations for his behavior 
and test each of them. She might seek to determine whether his 
propensity to consume tofu increases when he is offered different 
brands in the supermarket, or when he is dining in the absence of his 
partner. By identifying, then controlling for, the effect of these 
variables, she would arrive at a better picture of his true appetite for 
tofu. An ideal research design might take the form of an experiment: 
the researcher might want to place him in a room and offer him 
pairwise choices between tofu and other types of food, as well as 
between different types of tofu. 
The measurement of judicial ideology raises the same problems as 
the measurement of one’s taste for tofu. In order to measure either 
latent trait, scholars must instead measure some observable behavior 
or trait that they believe is correlated with the existence of the trait 
that is truly of interest. But there are limits to what can be inferred 
about a person’s attitudes from the behavior that we are capable of 
observing. In the real world—the world in which scholars of judicial 
behavior must operate—ideal research design is more dream than 
reality. Experiments, for the most part, are out of the question. One 
may attempt to observe judges in a laboratory setting, but it is not 
reasonable to expect them to behave as they would in the real world: 
their motivations and incentives in such a setting are not the same as 
they are in actual adjudication. At the same time, the constraints upon 
the data available for collection in the real world make it difficult, if 
not impossible, to isolate the effect of variables of interest, or to 
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control for the effect of potentially confounding variables. For 
example, if our research goal is to isolate the impact of constitutional 
text on Justice Scalia’s voting tendencies in First Amendment cases, 
we will never have the opportunity to observe him deciding a series 
of cases in which the text of the First Amendment varies while all 
other variables remain constant. As a result, the problem of 
potentially faulty inference from observable behavior cannot be 
eliminated. 
The insight that observable behavior is open to multiple 
interpretations goes by different names. Lawrence Baum refers to the 
“theoretical ambiguity of behavior”;26 others speak of “observational 
equivalence”27 or “behavioral equivalence.”28 Whatever name one 
attaches to the problem, it is endemic to the study of judicial 
ideology, and it greatly complicates efforts to evaluate competing 
hypotheses about the causes of judicial behavior. The ongoing debate 
over the relative merits of the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models29 
persists in part because the behavior that we observe can often be 
explained in more than one way. Consider, for example, the fact that 
Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in Dickerson v. 
United States,30 upholding Miranda v. Arizona,31 a landmark liberal 
decision of the Warren Court. His authorship of Dickerson is 
consistent with several different explanations. One possibility is that 
he sincerely preferred to uphold Miranda. Such a liberal policy 
preference would have been highly uncharacteristic of him, however, 
in light of the highly conservative leanings he had previously 
demonstrated over the course of decades on the Court.32 A second 
 
 26. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 20 (1997). 
 27. E.g., Gary J. Miller, The Political Evolution of Principal-Agent Models, 8 ANN. REV. 
POL. SCI. 203, 210, 212, 222 (2005) (citation omitted); Brian R. Sala & James F. Spriggs, II, 
Designing Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RES. Q. 197, 
201–02, 204 (2004) (devising a test of the separation-of-powers model that navigates around 
the observational equivalence of attitudinal and strategic behavior). 
 28. Kim, supra note 22, at 427. 
 29. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 30. 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 32. See, e.g., Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 
146 tbl.1 (2002) (identifying Chief Justice Rehnquist as the second-most conservative Justice to 
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possibility is that he voted against his ideological preferences: he 
might have preferred to strike down Miranda but felt constrained by 
legal considerations, especially the notion of stare decisis, to vote the 
other way. A third possibility is that he behaved both ideologically 
and strategically. Had he chosen to dissent, there would still have 
been six votes to uphold Miranda, and responsibility for assigning 
the task of writing the majority opinion would have fallen in that case 
upon Justice Stevens, the most senior member of the majority and 
also the most liberal member of the Court,33 who might have seized 
for himself the opportunity to author a bolder and more expansive 
opinion. Nor do the legal, attitudinal, and strategic models exhaust 
the possible explanations for his vote. He may have been motivated 
by a desire for the esteem of a particular audience—say, the readers 
of the New York Times,34 as opposed to the members of the Federalist 
Society.35  
The judicial treatment of precedent offers another demonstration 
of the difficulty of inferring ideological motivations from observable 
behavior. Suppose that a judge dissents from the decision of the court 
in case A and later votes in case B to limit the precedential reach of 
case A. Her vote in case B could reasonably be interpreted as an 
ideologically motivated effort to undermine a decision that she had 
opposed from the outset on ideological grounds.36 The fact that she 
votes merely to limit, rather than to overrule, case A can easily be 
explained as strategic behavior: her best strategy for achieving her 
ideological goals may be to build the necessary support for a formal 
overruling of case A over time, or simply to achieve the de facto 
overruling of case A by ensuring that it is gradually confined to its 
 
serve on the Court over the period spanning from 1953 to 1999); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 
15, at 322 tbl.8.2. 
 33. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32, at 146 tbl.1. 
 34. See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL 
BEHAVIOR 139 (2006) (noting the use of the term “Greenhouse effect,” named after New York 
Times reporter Linda Greenhouse, to describe the extent to which judges may be influenced by 
the promise of favorable media coverage). 
 35. See id. at 123–26; BAUM, supra note 26, at 40. 
  36. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15, at 77 (“[T]he justices have rarely acceded to 
[precedents] of which they disapprove.”); id. at 81 (arguing that “precedent . . . provides 
virtually no guide to the justices’ decisions” and “is a matter of good form, rather than a limit 
on the operation of judicial policy preferences”); id. at 288–311 (reporting that liberal Justices 
tend to uphold liberal precedents and to limit or overrule conservative precedents). 
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facts. But one might also reasonably interpret her behavior as 
motivated by legal, as opposed to ideological, considerations. The 
fact that her vote in case B is merely to limit, and not to overturn, the 
ruling in case A could reflect the constraining effect of precedent on 
her ideological motivations: given that it remains open to her to vote 
in favor of overruling case A, one might conclude that her behavior is 
guided not by ideological preference, but rather by the legal principle 
of stare decisis.37 
The phenomenon of panel composition effects poses a number of 
related methodological challenges, among them the problem of 
observational equivalence. Over a decade ago, Professor Revesz38 
and Professors Cross and Tiller39 discovered that the voting behavior 
of federal appeals court judges tends to vary with the partisan 
composition of the panels on which they happen to sit.40 On a three-
judge panel, a Democratic appointee tends to vote more liberally if 
paired with at least one other Democratic appointee than if he or she 
is the lone Democratic appointee, and to vote even more liberally if 
all three members of the panel are Democratic appointees; likewise, 
Republican appointees tend to vote more conservatively when they 
are in the majority than when they find themselves in the minority, 
and to vote even more conservatively when there is no Democratic 
appointee present at all.41 One challenge that empirical scholars must 
address, therefore, is the fact that panel composition effects can 
conceal the true extent of a judge’s ideological leanings. Because the 
influence of ideology on a judge’s voting behavior may be muted 
unless he or she is paired with at least one likeminded colleague, a 
simple analysis of individual judicial voting records that fails to 
 
 37. See Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of 
Justices’ Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049, 1051–52 
(1996). 
 38. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717 (1997). 
 39. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to 
Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998). 
 40. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 31–34 (reviewing different explanations that have been 
offered for the existence of panel-composition effects); Cross & Tiller, supra note 39, at 2171–
76; Revesz, supra note 38, at 1751–56. 
 41. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 39, at 2171–76; Revesz, supra note 38, at 1751–56. 
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control for panel composition is likely to underestimate the true 
extent of the judge’s ideological preferences. 
The other challenge that scholars face, however, is that of 
explaining why panel composition effects exist at all. The finding 
that judges tend to vote differently depending upon the partisan 
composition of the panel is open to a variety of explanations. One is 
the “whistleblower” hypothesis: on this view, the minority judge 
moderates the behavior of the other judges by threatening to expose 
“manipulation or disregard of the applicable legal doctrine.”42 A 
second explanation is the “dissent hypothesis”: on this view, the 
judges moderate their positions in order to avoid the costs involved in 
writing and responding to a dissent.43 A third explanation is the 
“deliberation hypothesis”: on this view, the judges on an 
ideologically divided panel converge in their views as a result of 
substantive deliberation.44 All three theories predict that judges on 
homogenous panels will show stronger ideological voting tendencies 
than judges on heterogeneous panels. If, however, the only behavior 
we ever observe is consistent with all three theories, then we have no 
way of ruling out any of the theories. 
C. The Multidimensionality of Judicial Ideology 
It is common to characterize judges and their votes as 
“conservative” or “liberal,” in much the same manner as we might 
describe the attitudes and behaviors of any ordinary person or 
political actor.45 Yet we also know that the terms “liberal” and 
“conservative” conceal a certain amount of heterogeneity. A judge 
may cast “conservative” votes in one category of cases (say, 
abortion) and “liberal” votes in another category (say, asylum). 
Whether we conclude that the judge in question is “liberal” or 
“conservative” will depend in such situations on which set of votes 
we happen to observe. By observing only one set of votes, we would 
 
 42. Cross & Tiller, supra note 39, at 2156, 2171. 
 43. See Revesz, supra note 38, at 1733–34. 
 44. See id. at 1732–34. 
 45. See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15, at 86, 309–10, 329–31. 
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measure only one dimension of the judge’s multidimensional 
ideology. 
In practice, however, the challenge that multidimensionality poses 
to the measurement of judicial ideology may not be as severe as this 
hypothetical example might suggest. The views that people hold 
across a range of questions tend to correlate with one another in 
systematic ways. Electoral competition encourages the formation of 
political coalitions and the articulation of competing ideologies that 
distinguish one coalition from another and define the battle lines of 
popular politics. Indeed, it is the systematic correlation of views 
across related but distinct topics that defines an “ideology,” or system 
of ideas. If political views were not correlated with one another, it 
would be impossible to speak of ideology at all; we would confront 
only disorganized collections of views lacking any kind of internal 
coherence at every turn. Nevertheless, even if it happens to be the 
case that, on the whole, judges who reach stereotypically 
conservative conclusions in abortion cases also tend to reach 
stereotypically conservative conclusions in asylum cases, 
generalizations from a judge’s attitudes in one area of law to those in 
another may not always hold true. 
It is difficult to identify actual settings in which judicial ideology 
is multidimensional because there is no generally accepted 
methodology for assessing the dimensionality of an ideology space.46 
There are a variety of scaling techniques available for estimating 
multidimensional voter preferences, but these techniques may yield 
disparate estimates of dimensionality.47 Thus, it may not be possible 
 
 46. See KEITH T. POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING 141–47 (2005); 
James J. Heckman & James M. Snyder, Jr., Linear Probability Models of the Demand for 
Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators, 28 RAND 
J. ECON. S142, S170–S171 (1997).  
 47. Compare, e.g., KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING 27–29 (1997) (arguing that only two dimensions 
are necessary to represent congressional preferences), with Heckman & Snyder, supra note 46, 
at S171–S173 (arguing that at least six dimensions are necessary). See also Timothy J. Brazill 
& Bernard Grofman, Factor Analysis Versus Multi-Dimensional Scaling: Binary Choice Roll-
Call Voting and the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 SOCIAL NETWORKS 201 (2002) (showing that 
factor analysis yields systematically higher estimates of dimensionality than multi-dimensional 
scaling as applied to both simulated data and actual Supreme Court voting data). 
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to verify the adequacy of a one-dimensional model of judicial 
ideology using current methods. 
Recent research provides some support for the assumption of 
unidimensional ideology that underlies most empirical scholarship on 
the U.S. Supreme Court. A study by Professors Grofman and Brazill 
estimates that between 80% and 93% of the variation in the Justices’ 
voting patterns over the period from 1953 to 1991 can be explained in 
terms of disagreement along a single dimension.48 That study reports, 
moreover, that the extent to which voting on the Supreme Court is 
unidimensional appears only to be increasing over time.49 In a 
different paper, however, Grofman and Brazill observe that their 
methodology appears to overstate the importance of the primary 
dimension.50 Although the full extent of the problem is unknown, 
their results show that at least 14% of the variation in Supreme Court 
voting cannot be explained by a single dimension of disagreement.51 
This shortfall may be enough to render the unidimensionality 
assumption problematic for many applications.  
At the same time, the assumption of unidimensional ideology may 
not hold as well for other courts as it does for the United States 
Supreme Court. Very little is known about the dimensionality of 
ideology on other courts, and further investigation is surely 
warranted. Recent studies, for example, suggest that ideological 
disagreement in the Supreme Court of Canada may be significantly 
more multidimensional than in the U.S. Supreme Court.52 The voting 
 
 48. See Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median Justice on the 
Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural Courts” 1953–1991, 
112 PUB. CHOICE 55, 58 (2002). The 80% figure is a conservative estimate; the amount of 
variation depended on the model used. See id. (reporting that unidimensional models explained 
from 80% to 93% of the variation). 
 49. See id. (observing that “by the time we get to the Rehnquist courts the finding of 
strong unidimensionality is indisputable”). 
 50. See Brazill & Grofman, supra note 47, at 217. 
 51. See id. (reporting that, on average, a unidimensional approach to the Supreme Court 
voting data analyzed by the authors explained 86% of the variance). 
 52. See Benjamin R.D. Alarie & Andrew Green, The Reasonable Justice: An Empirical 
Analysis of Frank Iacobucci’s Career on the Supreme Court of Canada, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 
195 (2007); C.L. Ostberg et al., Attitudinal Dimensions of Supreme Court Decision Making in 
Canada: The Lamer Court, 1991–1995, 55 POL. RES. Q. 235, 242–49 (2002) (concluding on the 
basis of factor analysis that ideological disagreement on the Canadian Supreme Court occurs 
along three dimensions-namely, a communitarian versus libertarian dimension, a “fairness” 
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behavior of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé illustrates the problem 
vividly. In their analysis of all votes cast on the Canadian Supreme 
Court over a period of more than thirteen years, Professors Alarie and 
Green report that she compiled the most “conservative” voting record 
of anyone on the court;53 indeed, their estimate of her ideal point 
identifies her as an “extreme” justice.54 They are quick to note, 
however, that their overall characterization of Justice L’Heureux-
Dubé is confounded by her radically divergent voting patterns across 
different areas of law. In criminal appeals and cases involving claims 
under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, her voting 
record was indeed the most conservative, and significantly more 
conservative than that of the median justice.55 In labor cases, 
however, she compiled the most liberal voting record of the sixteen 
justices included in the study, while in the area of aboriginal law, hers 
was the fourth-most liberal voting record.56  
As Alarie and Green freely acknowledge, their ideal-point 
estimation techniques—which are the same as those underlying the 
influential Martin-Quinn scores for Supreme Court Justices in the 
United States57—rest upon the assumption that the ideological 
ordering of the justices “should not depend on the underlying area of 
law,”58 but this assumption proves highly problematic in the case of 
Justice L’Heureux-Dubé. Her overall characterization as 
“conservative” and “extreme”59 reflects as much the happenstance 
composition of the court’s docket as her own behavior: if the docket 
were sufficiently dominated by labor and aboriginal cases, the same 
estimation techniques would identify her as liberal rather than 
conservative. Nor is there any obvious way to correct the weighting 
 
dimension in the area of criminal procedure, and a “judicial activism” versus self-restraint 
dimension). 
 53. See Alarie & Green, supra note 52, at tbl.1, 209–14, 209 fig.2, 210 tbl.2. 
 54. Id. at 209–10. 
 55. See id. at 210. 
 56. See id. at 207 tbl.1, 210; see also Ostberg et al., supra note 52, at 242–44 
(characterizing Justice L’Heureux-Dubé as having a “communitarian orientation” that is more 
conservative on issues of criminal justice but more liberal with respect to the treatment of 
disadvantaged groups). 
 57. See id. at 205–07 (citing Martin & Quinn, supra note 32). 
 58. Id. at 210. 
 59. See supra notes 53–54. 
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of different types of cases in order to produce an undistorted picture 
of her ideology: any weighting that researchers might devise runs the 
risk of appearing arbitrary.60 
III. METHODS FOR MEASURING JUDICIAL IDEOLOGY 
Statistical analysis has become so commonplace in the study of 
judicial behavior that it is easy to overlook the steps that are 
necessary to convert cases, judges, and decisions into numerical 
quantities to be analyzed. A variety of methods have been developed 
for quantifying decisions, judicial ideology, and characteristics of 
cases. There is no “ideal” method for quantifying cases; each of these 
methods has its merits and its shortcomings. Too often, however, 
little attention is paid to these crucial methodological choices, and 
methods of coding cases or measuring ideology seem to be chosen 
casually based on “current practice,” without careful attention to the 
objectives of the study. As we will demonstrate, the way that case 
outcomes and ideology are measured can have a large impact on the 
results of a study. Careful consideration of how cases are selected and 
outcomes are coded is necessary if we are to interpret the results of 
any study properly, or to understand what hypotheses can, or cannot, 
be tested within a particular empirical framework. 
Part III.A looks at the first step of the quantification of cases: the 
coding of decisions. This may be done by reference to the presence or 
absence of particular actions, such as overturning agency rulings, or 
providing relief for certain kinds of plaintiffs. Alternatively, judicial 
actions may be labeled subjectively by the researcher as “liberal” or 
“conservative.” Finally, studies may employ an “agnostic” coding 
scheme, by which the ideological direction of a particular outcome is 
a function of the voting alignment of judges in the case. Any of these 
coding methods can be used in a narrow data set focusing on a 
particular class of cases, or on a broad aggregation of cases across 
varying issue areas.  
 
 60. See David S. Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1277, 1300–01 n.104 (2008) (discussing the problems inherent in constructing any 
index that weights and combines different dimensions of a given phenomenon).  
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Part III.B discusses different ways of measuring judicial 
“ideology.” Empirical scholars on courts have developed several 
methodologies for surmounting the various obstacles to the 
measurement of judicial ideology described in Parts I and II. One 
method, used frequently for the courts of appeals and district courts, 
is to use “proxy variables”—variables constructed from observable 
characteristics of judges that are believed to be correlated with their 
true ideologies. Such proxy variables have traditionally included the 
party of the President who appointed the judge, or the judge’s race, 
gender, or professional background. More recently, more 
sophisticated “composite proxy variables” have been developed that 
attempt to account for the influence of competing actors over the 
nomination and confirmation of judges.61 
An alternative—and often preferable—approach is to treat each 
judge’s ideology as a latent variable to be estimated from data on the 
judge’s actual behavior. These behavioral-assessment methods for 
estimating ideology range quite widely in sophistication, from simple 
vote-counting approaches to extraordinarily complex structural 
models. The advantage of measuring ideology in this manner is that it 
avoids the measurement error that is intrinsic to all proxy variables. 
Finally, we describe a method that might best be thought of as a 
hybrid of the two previous methods. In this approach, estimates of 
judicial ideology derived from data on a judge’s actual behavior in 
one context are “transplanted” into a different context. Although this 
approach has the potential to combine the best of both worlds by 
marrying the precision of behavioral assessment with the 
convenience of proxy variables, the results produced in this manner 
can be difficult to interpret and require extreme care. We will discuss 
some of the benefits and pitfalls of these methods below. 
 
 61. See, e.g., Micheal W. Giles et al., Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and 
Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, 
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 
(1989). 
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A. Ways of Coding Cases 
One of the most challenging aspects of the quantitative study of 
judicial decision-making is that there is nothing inherently 
quantitative about a judicial decision.62 It is therefore necessary for 
researchers to select and employ some method for converting judicial 
decisions into numerical quantities for statistical analysis. Each of the 
most common methods for doing so, however, embodies different 
assumptions that can have considerable implications for the meaning 
and interpretation of a study’s findings.  
Most empirical studies on the subject of judicial ideology rely on 
some sort of dichotomous coding scheme, in which observable 
judicial actions–typically a vote or decision of some kind–are coded 
as “zero” or “one,” depending on whether they are, in some rough 
sense, “liberal” or “conservative.” Often, regression analysis is then 
used to estimate the impact of some measure of ideology on the 
actions that have been coded in this manner. It is impossible to 
interpret the results of this type of analysis correctly, however, unless 
we first understand precisely why a given vote or outcome has been 
characterized as “liberal” or “conservative.” As we explore below, 
each of the common methods of coding cases embodies a particular 
conception of judicial ideology. 
There are three ways in which researchers commonly code cases, 
which correspond to three distinct conceptions of ideology. First, the 
researcher can implement a “narrow” approach to coding, and thus a 
“narrow” conception of judicial ideology as well, by measuring 
judges’ propensities to rule in a particular direction in a certain area 
of law or on a specific legal issue. Second, the researcher can adopt a 
“broad approach” by measuring the propensity of judges to rule in a 
“liberal” or “conservative” direction, as defined subjectively by the 
researcher, across a broad range of cases. Third, the researcher can 
pursue an “agnostic” approach by measuring the propensity of judges 
to vote in the same way as certain other prespecified judges. Unlike 
the “narrow” approach, the “agnostic” approach can be applied across 
a range of cases. Unlike the “broad” approach, however, the 
 
 62. Exceptions include sentencing decisions and damage awards. 
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“agnostic” approach does not require the researcher to apply value 
labels to votes or outcomes. The least intuitive of the three 
approaches (at least at first glance), it is agnostic in the sense that the 
researcher does not need to decide whether any particular outcome is 
“liberal” or “conservative,” but rather allows the directionality of 
each outcome to be determined by the voting alignments among the 
judges. 
1. The “Narrow” Approach  
The most common way to code outcomes, which implements 
what we call a “narrow” conception of ideology, is to examine cases 
in a single area of law, or that address a particular legal issue, and to 
designate cases as “pro-plaintiff” if the rulings provide some 
threshold level of relief to the plaintiff. Depending on the context, 
readers may recognize these outcomes as “liberal” or “conservative”; 
for example, a ruling in favor of a union in a labor case or a 
defendant in a criminal case would commonly be referred to as 
“liberal.” But when the data is limited to a particular issue area, these 
terms should be construed narrowly.  
The advantage to limiting inquiry to a single issue area (or 
analyzing multiple issue areas separately) is that judicial preferences 
are likely to be unidimensional within a given issue area. Judges may 
well hold preferences that are unidimensional across the entire range 
of cases that they decide, such that a judge who is liberal in criminal 
cases tends also to be liberal in sex discrimination cases, and vice 
versa. As discussed above in Part II, however, this assumption may 
not always hold true. Confining the analysis to a single issue area 
makes it unnecessary to assume that a judge who is more “liberal” on 
a particular issue must prefer “liberal” outcomes over other unrelated 
issues. Nor does one need to identify which outcome is “liberal” in 
ideologically cross-cutting areas of law. It is simply enough to 
assume that some judges are more or less likely to support asylum 
claims, or employment discrimination claims, or industry challenges 
of agency rulemaking. To the extent that judicial ideology is multi-
dimensional, a narrow, issue-specific approach to the measurement of 
ideology is appropriate because it avoids the conflation of dissimilar 
preferences or, in more colloquial terms, the comparison of apples 
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and oranges. Proper delineation of a specific issue area then becomes 
crucial if we are to maintain a plausible assumption of one-
dimensional preferences.  
An issue-specific approach to the measurement of judicial 
ideology is not foolproof. Delineation of the issue area can itself pose 
challenges, as the contours of the area may vary depending on the 
court, the time period, and the type of cases presented. Cases that 
present multiple issues may defy easy categorization and require 
scholars to exercise judgment in deciding which of them should be 
included in a particular study.63 Even in what is commonly 
understood to be a specific area of law—say, criminal law—the data 
may need to be subdivided further in order to ensure that apples are 
compared only to apples. Depending upon the context, it may be 
proper to separate these cases into those involving white-collar and 
blue-collar crimes, due process claims, sentencing challenges, issues 
of statutory interpretation, and so forth. Moreover, even if one 
addresses the problem of multidimensionality by measuring ideology 
on an issue-by-issue basis, the problem of observational equivalence 
remains: it may only be possible to measure judges’ propensities to 
vote in a particular direction, and not necessarily their motivations. A 
tendency to favor asylum claimants, for instance, could stem from 
sympathetic attitudes toward immigrants, or from a preference for a 
particular interpretation of the relevant asylum statutes, or from lack 
of deference toward agency adjudications in general or immigration 
courts in particular. 
2. The “Broad” Approach 
The other common approach to case-coding is to collect and 
aggregate data that span many issue areas, on the premise that a 
single dimension explains judges’ preferences across these many 
 
 63. See Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Into the Sunset, 
24 CONST. COMMENT 299, 305–08 (2007) (arguing that the manner in which Harold Spaeth’s 
widely used Supreme Court database is coded ignores the multiplicity of issues present in most 
Supreme Court cases); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical 
Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 488–530 (2009) (discussing, and 
attempting to measure, the extent to which the manner in which the coding of Spaeth’s database 
masks important information about the legal issues present in each case). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Judicial Ideology 159 
 
 
dimensions. This approach is premised upon what we might call the 
“broad” conception of ideology. It is commonly used in studies of the 
Supreme Court; because the Court hears relatively few cases, it may 
not be feasible to separate cases by issue and still have enough data 
for meaningful empirical analysis. Furthermore, as discussed in Part 
II.C, a single ideological dimension explains a large part of Supreme 
Court voting. In such studies, the ideology spectrum is necessarily 
amorphous: it could represent a preference for certain kinds of policy 
outcomes, or for methods of statutory or constitutional interpretation, 
or any combination of these and other influences. 
Whether a unidimensional approach to the measurement of 
judicial ideology across different issue areas is appropriate will 
depend upon the application. Although a single dimension explains 
much of the voting behavior on the Supreme Court, this varies 
substantially by issue area, as we demonstrate in Part IV.B. A single 
dimension, for example, explains a large component of voting in 
criminal procedure and civil liberties cases, but is much less effective 
at explaining economic and tax cases. If the primary goal of the 
research is to derive a rough estimate for the influence of ideology in 
a particular court, or to examine how the ideology of the Justices 
changes over time,64 then a single dimension may well be sufficient 
(provided, of course, that one can arrive at a substantively satisfying 
definition of ideology in the first place). Likewise, the 
unidimensional approach may suffice if the goal is to study the effect 
of external influences on judicial behavior, for example, such as the 
extent to which Congress constrains the Supreme Court65 or appellate 
review constrains lower courts.66 However, it may be wise to restrict 
 
 64. See, e.g., Martin & Quinn, supra note 32; Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON & ORG. 365, 366 (2007); 
Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How 
Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483, 1493–97 (2007). 
 65. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: 
The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247 (2003); Anna Harvey & Barry 
Friedman, Pulling Punches: Congressional Constraints on the Supreme Court’s Constitutional 
Rulings, 1987–2000, 31 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 533 (2006); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers 
Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997); Pablo 
T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants 
of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). 
 66. See, e.g., David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of Reversal as an Explanation of 
Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579 (2003); Donald R. Songer et al., The 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
160 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:133 
 
 
analysis to issue areas that are well explained by the unidimensional 
approach. 
To their disadvantage, however, unidimensional models that 
aggregate cases over multiple issues compound the problem of 
observational equivalence. Those using the aggregative approach 
must deal not only with the fact that cross-cutting motivations may be 
at work in the same issue area, but also with the additional challenge 
of determining the extent to which a given motivation applies across 
different areas. If, for example, both originalism and political 
conservatism could lead to the same combination of judicial votes, it 
may be impossible to distinguish between these two theories of 
behavior in a single area of law, much less across multiple areas. 
Such theories can only be tested by a model that allows preferences 
along multiple dimensions, in the context of cases that generate a 
clash between the two motivations. 
A final difficulty with aggregating cases along a single dimension 
is that it may be impossible to determine the direction of the outcome 
objectively. If a state is defending a liberal policy in a federalism 
case—say, Gonzales v. Raich67—what position is to be considered 
the “liberal” one? Traditionally, liberal judges have been advocates of 
federal power in federalism disputes, but one could imagine, in a 
close case, that liberal judges might be more likely to uphold the 
state’s liberal policy against a claim of federal power. Such a case 
presents a tension between preferences along two dimensions—
federalism and social policy—that can only be resolved on the basis 
of some explicit understanding of the relative importance of the two 
dimensions to the case and to the judges themselves. 
The potential perils of unidimensional case coding are highlighted 
by two recent working papers68 that criticize the subjective coding 
 
Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court 
Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994). 
 67. 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (ruling, in favor of the federal government, that California lacked 
the power to legalize the use of marijuana for medicinal purposes). 
 68. See Anna Harvey, What Makes a Judgment “Liberal”? Coding Bias in the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database (June 15, 2008), http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/ 
2787/harveymeasurementerror.pdf; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial 
Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403. 
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decisions found in the most widely used database of Supreme Court 
decisions, Harold Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database.69 
In one, Professor Harvey considers cases that involve constitutional 
challenges to federal statutes and estimates the “ideology” of a statute 
by using a measure based on the members of Congress who voted in 
favor of it.70 For these cases, the correlation between the objective 
measure and the subjective coding in the Spaeth database is low, and 
the association is statistically insignificant.71 Harvey’s findings 
suggest that many cases may not be amenable to coding on a single 
“liberal” to “conservative” dimension, and that the results of studies 
that do rely upon such unidimensional coding schemes may well be 
artifacts of subjective coding decisions. 
In the other paper, Professor Landes and Judge Posner reanalyze 
the coding decisions made in Spaeth’s Supreme Court database and 
Donald Songer’s Court of Appeals database72 and challenge the 
original coding choices in many case categories.73 With respect to the 
Supreme Court database, Landes and Posner take issue with the 
coding decisions made in such areas as commercial speech, campaign 
finance, labor law, and administrative law.74 With respect to the 
Court of Appeals database, they object to the coding choices made in 
a variety of legal contexts including white-collar crime, same-sex 
harassment, and intellectual property.75 Many of these categories are 
indeed difficult to code because they present conflicting issues. 
Without taking a position on the proper way to code outcomes in any 
 
 69. See Supreme Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sctdata.htm (follow “The 
Original U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database” hyperlinks for documentation and data in 
different formats) (last visited Apr. 14, 2009). 
 70. The measure is the change in status quo of the Poole-Rosenthal “Nominate” measures 
of the statute, based on the roll call of Senators and Representatives who voted for and against 
it. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 47. 
 71. See Harvey, supra note 68, at 19–20. The correlation is 0.12. E-mail from Anna 
Harvey, Associate Professor of Politics, New York University, to Joshua Fischman, Assistant 
Professor of Economics, Tufts University (Mar. 28, 2008, 10:26:12 EDT) (on file with the 
authors). 
 72. See Appeals Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm (follow 
hyperlinks to different versions of the data and corresponding documentation) (last visited Apr. 
14, 2009). 
 73. See Landes & Posner, supra note 68. 
 74. Id. at 42. 
 75. Id. at 43–44. 
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of these categories, it suffices to note that highly distinguished 
scholars can disagree on the directionality of Supreme Court rulings. 
Whether the outcomes of any studies hinge on their particular coding 
decisions remains to be seen. But this disagreement suggests that it 
may be impossible to construct an objective measure of coding 
Supreme Court decisions in a single dimension. 
3. The “Agnostic” Approach 
In order to avoid these difficulties, some studies employ an 
“agnostic” method of coding cases that does not require the 
researcher to make a subjective assessment of the direction of each 
outcome. Rather, these coding schemes estimate the direction of the 
outcome from the voting alignment of the judges: if the “liberal” 
judges all vote in favor of the same outcome, that must be the 
“liberal” outcome. Agnostic coding can be counterintuitive because 
the ideology of the judges must be inferred from their votes at the 
same time that the directionality of each case is inferred from the 
judges’ positions. On first impression, the process may seem to 
involve a degree of circularity or bootstrapping: how can the 
direction of case outcomes and the ideology of judges be inferred 
simultaneously from one another? The key to understanding how 
agnostic coding models work is to realize that they do not measure 
ideology with reference to any particular kind of concrete outcome; 
rather, they measure ideology purely in terms of voting alignments. 
Interpretation of the results from such models requires an 
understanding of the scale along which judicial ideology is being 
measured. The typical way of defining the scale is to identify the 
judges who represent the “liberal” and “conservative” ends of the 
spectrum, and to treat them as anchor points. Consider the most well-
known application of agnostic coding: the “ideal points” that 
Professors Martin and Quinn calculate for Supreme Court Justices.76 
In this context, to be “liberal” might mean to be “Brennan-like”: a 
“liberal” Justice is one who often voted with Brennan, or who often 
voted with Justices who often voted with Brennan. Similarly, to be 
 
 76. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32, at 147–51. 
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“conservative” might mean to be “Rehnquist-like.”77 For an 
American audience, this interpretation is quite intuitive; most readers 
are familiar with the positions that liberal and conservative Supreme 
Court Justices typically take. Nevertheless, the interpretation of this 
agnostic ideology spectrum requires some understanding of the 
Justices’ positions that is external to the study. Consider, for 
example, Alarie and Green’s estimation of an agnostic model of 
ideology on the Canadian Supreme Court.78 One could conceive of 
the ideological spectrum of Canadian justices as ranging from 
“L’Heureux-Dubé-like” to “Sopinka-like.”79 However, for readers 
who are unfamiliar with Canadian constitutional law—and, indeed, 
perhaps even for Canadian constitutional scholars—such an 
ideological scale may prove less than intuitive. 
Although agnostic coding methods are often associated with 
highly sophisticated empirical studies, such as the Martin-Quinn 
approach to ideal point estimation,80 they have also found use in 
many non-technical applications. In some of the earliest empirical 
studies of the Supreme Court, the political scientist Herman Pritchett 
constructed tables showing how often each pair of Justices was in 
agreement, or how often each pair dissented together, within a 
particular time period.81 Pritchett’s approach constituted a form of 
agnostic coding because he only examined whether Justices voted 
together, and did not make any effort to label individual votes as 
“liberal” or “conservative.” Using these indicators of agreement, 
Pritchett was able to identify blocs of Justices who often voted 
together. For example, he concluded that in the 1939 and 1940 
Terms, there were two voting blocs—one consisting of Justices 
McReynolds, Roberts, Hughes, and Stone, and another consisting of 
Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, Douglas, and Black—with Justice 
 
 77. The actual Martin-Quinn model uses more than two anchor points. It includes prior 
assumptions about the starting ideal points of Justices Harlan, Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, 
Frankfurter, Fortas, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas. See id. at 147. 
 78. Alarie & Green, supra note 52; supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 79. See Alarie & Green, supra note 52, at 210 tbl.2. 
 80. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32, at 147–51; supra text accompanying note 76. 
 81. See, e.g., C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U. S. 
Supreme Court, 1939–1941, 35 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 (1941) [hereinafter Pritchett, Divisions 
of Opinion]; C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: Votes and Values, 42 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 53 (1948). 
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Reed in the middle as the swing vote.82 Pritchett identified the former 
bloc as the “right wing” and the latter bloc as the “left wing,”83 but 
these labels required some familiarity with the Justices and the issues 
of the time that was external to his empirical analysis.84 
Agnostic coding holds powerful attractions for empirical scholars 
of judicial behavior. Because the ideological direction of each 
outcome is inferred from the data, there is generally little need for 
concern that the results reflect subjective coding decisions by the 
author of the study.85 Another advantage of agnostic coding is that it 
facilitates the analysis of large data sets by reducing the amount of 
effort required to code each case. In a recent paper, for example, 
Professor Ho was able to analyze over 17,000 FCC adjudications 
over a period spanning four decades.86 This already formidable 
project might have been prohibitively impractical, had a subjective 
assessment of ideological orientation been necessary for each 
adjudication.  
But the agnostic approach to coding has its shortcomings as well. 
For starters, models of this type generally assume a one-dimensional 
spectrum, yet it may be difficult to know what distortions this 
assumption might cause. Although methods exist for estimating the 
dimensionality of ideology on multimember courts87—at least when 
the composition of the court is fixed and judges vote sincerely—these 
methods are not applicable to courts in which judges decide cases 
alone or on rotating panels. If the assumption of unidimensional 
 
 82. See Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion, supra note 81, at 893–95. 
 83. See id. at 895. 
 84. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 
1089, 1101–04 (2005). 
 85. As a practical matter, however, agnostic coding and the more traditional coding 
approach used in the popular Spaeth database, see supra notes 63, 68–75 and accompanying 
text, may in practice yield highly similar results, at least in the context of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. When Professor Bafumi and his colleagues estimated an agnostic model of Supreme 
Court voting, they found that the direction of the outcome predicted by their model coincided 
with the coding of such votes in the Spaeth database more than 95% of the time. See Joseph 
Bafumi et al., Practical Issues in Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point 
Estimation, 13 POL. ANALYSIS 171, 181 (2005). 
 86. See Daniel E. Ho, Congressional Agency Control: The Impact of Statutory Partisan 
Requirements on Regulation (May 2007), http://law.bepress.com/alea/17th/art73. 
 87. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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ideology does not hold true, the estimates from the model may be 
misleading.  
Another problem with agnostic models is that they cannot make 
use of unanimous opinions, since it is impossible to draw any 
inference about the relative positions of the judges from the voting 
alignment in a unanimous decision. This should not be a liability if 
unanimous opinions truly do not convey any information, for 
instance, if they are cases in which the law is controlling and 
ideology does not play a role. However, there are many courts in 
which voting takes place under a “norm of consensus,” so that dissent 
is discouraged or possibly even forbidden.88 This is certainly true of 
the federal courts of appeals89 and has been shown to be true in the 
U.S. Supreme Court in earlier eras.90 In such contexts, the use of an 
agnostic coding model requires the researcher to discard a large 
proportion of the data, which may include many cases in which 
ideology did in fact have an impact on the outcome. 
Finally, results derived from agnostically coded data may be more 
difficult to interpret substantively, since ideology in this context only 
measures how often particular judges vote with each other, and not 
how often they support particular types of outcomes. A judge may be 
deemed to be “liberal” because she frequently votes with certain 
liberal judges, but it would be impossible to know from agnostically 
coded data how often she supports the rights of criminal defendants 
or political protestors. 
To recap, Part IV.A of this Article has identified three common 
approaches to the coding of case outcomes for empirical analysis, and 
to the definition of “ideology” itself. The “narrow” approach focuses 
upon judges’ propensities to rule in a particular direction in a certain 
class of cases. The “broad” approach measures propensities to rule in 
a “liberal” or “conservative” direction, as defined subjectively by the 
 
 88. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 
135–36, 138, 142–43 (1990); M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back 
Again: A Theory of Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 292–341; Joshua B. Fischman, Estimating 
Preferences of Appellate Judges: A Model of “Consensus Voting” (Mar. 20, 2009), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 361348. 
 89. See Fischman, supra note 88, at 1. 
 90. See Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 362 (2001). 
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researcher, in a broad class of cases. The “agnostic” approach, 
finally, measures the propensities of judges to align themselves with 
certain other judges. 
In theory, these approaches need not yield different findings. 
Specifically, if ideology were purely one-dimensional, the differences 
among them would be irrelevant. It would not matter if judicial 
“liberalism” were defined in terms of case outcomes or voting 
alignments: a judge who favors liberal outcomes would also be one 
who votes with other liberal judges. Nor would it matter if cases were 
examined by issue area or aggregated over many areas of case law. In 
practice, however, these approaches do yield different results, and 
they do so precisely because ideology is never perfectly one-
dimensional. Moreover, the more that actual judicial ideology 
deviates from the assumption of unidimensionality, the more that the 
results of empirical analysis will be sensitive to the manner in which 
case outcomes are coded. 
B. Types of Ideology Measures 
1. Proxy Measures 
a. Party Affiliation and Other Simple Proxy Measures 
As previously discussed,91 the ideology of a judge cannot be 
observed directly. What motivates judges to decide cases in certain 
ways is a combination of attitudes, beliefs, and experiences that 
cannot be measured in the same objective fashion as a physical 
phenomenon. Thus, to understand the impact of ideology in empirical 
studies, scholars have often resorted to using “proxy variables”—
variables that are thought to be correlated with a judge’s underlying 
ideology. Various studies have, for instance, examined the impact of 
gender,92 race,93 religion,94 and prior professional background95 on 
 
 91. See supra Part II.A. 
 92. For a more detailed discussion of this literature, see Christina L. Boyd et al., 
Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging (July 28, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
1001748. 
 93. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2008). 
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judicial decisions, on the premise that such characteristics may be 
correlated with the judge’s policy preferences across a broad range of 
issues.  
A particularly obvious and convenient proxy for a judge’s 
ideology is that of membership in a political party. The linkage 
between a judge’s party affiliation and his or her voting behavior has 
long been established.96 One of the earliest empirical studies to 
examine differences among judges by party affiliation dates back to 
1959, when Glendon Schubert analyzed decisions in workmen’s 
compensation cases from the Michigan Supreme Court and found 
that judges who belonged to the Democratic Party were substantially 
more likely to favor employee claimants in these cases.97 Two years 
later, Stuart Nagel published a comprehensive study in which he 
examined differences in voting behavior among the nation’s nearly 
three hundred state and federal supreme court justices.98 He found 
jurists who identified themselves as Democrats to be significantly 
more liberal than those who identified themselves as Republicans in 
every issue area he examined, including criminal law, administrative 
law, civil liberties, tax, family law, business, and personal injury.99 
The most popular proxy for a judge’s ideology, however, has been 
the party of the official who appointed the judge. The enduring 
popularity of this measure most likely derives from a combination of 
two factors. First, the party affiliation of the President or other 
elected official responsible for appointing a particular judge is easy 
both to observe and to interpret. Second, the correlation between 
party of appointing official and judicial ideology has long been 
 
 94. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: 
An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004); Gregory C. 
Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical 
Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 759–64 (2005). 
 95. See, e.g., Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An 
Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1420–21, 1470–80 (1998); 
Sisk et al., supra note 94, at 608–12. 
 96. See GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
(1959); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961–
1964, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966); Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and 
Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843 (1961). 
 97. See SCHUBERT, supra note 96, at 129–42. 
 98. See Nagel, supra note 96, at 843. 
 99. See id. at 845–46. 
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observed over a variety of courts, time periods, and issue areas: 
Democratic appointees are typically more liberal on a variety of 
issues than Republican appointees. 
The appointing-party measure has been especially dominant in 
studies of the federal courts. As of 1999, one paper had identified 
forty-one empirical studies that examined differences by party of 
appointing president on the circuit courts, and twenty-five such 
studies on the district courts.100 Although a comprehensive treatment 
of this literature would be far beyond the scope of this Article, it 
would suffice to say that party of appointment has been shown 
consistently to be a statistically significant predictor of votes in most 
types of cases in the courts of appeals, but is less consistently 
correlated with judicial decision-making in the district courts.101 
Among the many studies dating back several decades that have 
identified a relationship between party of appointing president and 
judicial voting on the federal courts of appeals,102 a recent study by 
Cass Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Ellman103 has perhaps 
attracted the most public attention.104 The authors examined the 
influence of party of appointment on decision-making in the courts of 
 
 100. See Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A 
Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 225–27 tbl.1, 230–31 tbl.2 (1999). Not all of the studies 
canvassed by Pinello employed party of appointing president as a proxy variable in a regression 
analysis. 
 101. See id. at 236 tbl.3. 
 102. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 
CAL. L. REV. 1457, 1479–81 (2003) (reviewing scholarly use of the party proxy in studies of 
judicial ideology over the preceding thirty years); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the 
United States Courts of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491, 497 n.24 (1975) (finding 
a significant relationship between party of appointing president and the voting behavior of 
appeals court judges in the areas of criminal procedure and civil rights); Donald R. Songer, The 
Policy Consequences of Senate Involvement in the Selection of Judges in the United States 
Courts of Appeals, 35 W. POL. Q. 107, 111 (1982) (finding a significant relationship between 
judicial voting patterns and the party of both the appointing President and the judge’s home-
state Senators). 
 103. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A 
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301 (2004); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006) (expanding 
upon the earlier article).  
 104. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 94, at 754–55 (describing the political attention attracted 
by the Sunstein et al. study); id. at 756 (noting that “[w]hat is perhaps most remarkable about 
Sunstein’s study . . . is that it is not remarkable,” in that it did not “break[] new ground in either 
methods or conclusions” but rather built upon several decades of earlier scholarship).  
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appeals across fourteen issue areas and found a statistically 
significant relationship in eleven of them.105 They also found that the 
voting behavior of individual judges was significantly correlated with 
the appointing party of that judge’s panel colleagues in nine of these 
issue areas.106 Earlier107 and subsequent108 studies alike have revealed 
similar party and panel composition effects in administrative law 
cases.  
Party of appointment has been shown to be a much weaker proxy, 
however, for judicial ideology in studies of the federal district courts. 
One of the most careful studies of district courts, which examined 
federal civil rights and prisoner cases in three district courts, found 
that party of appointment was not a statistically significant predictor 
of how the judges ruled.109 But another large-scale study of district 
court decisions in criminal and civil liberties cases found that party 
effects changed over time: party differences were insignificant from 
1960 through 1968, but Democratic appointees were significantly 
more liberal in the period between 1969 and 1976.110 A more recent 
study of criminal sentencing found that, controlling for other relevant 
factors, Democratic appointees tend to give shorter sentences for 
serious crimes.111 
Although party of appointment and other proxy variables can be 
useful and significant predictors of judicial voting, several important 
caveats are in order, both for those who employ such variables in 
their own research, and for those who encounter them in the 
 
 105. See Sunstein et al., supra note 103, at 318–28. The exceptions were criminal appeals, 
federalism, and takings. Id. at 325–27. The latter two of these categories suffered from a small 
sample size; with more data, party of appointment may well have risen to statistical 
significance. Id. 
 106. See id. In abortion and capital punishment cases, a judge’s own appointing party, but 
not the appointing party of the other two judges on a panel, was a significant predictor of how 
the judge would vote. Id. at 328. 
 107. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 39, at 2168–75; Revesz, supra note 38, at 1719. 
 108. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy?: An 
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (2006). 
 109. See Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial 
Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 276 (1995). 
 110. See C.K. Rowland & Robert A. Carp, A Longitudinal Study of Party Effects on 
Federal District Court Policy Propensities, 24 AM. J. POL. SCI. 291, 296 (1980). 
 111. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing 
Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 
727 (2008). 
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scholarship of others. First, proxy variables such as party of 
appointment should not be misinterpreted as causal variables. A 
judge does not think, “I was appointed by a Republican President; 
therefore, I should take the conservative position.” Having been 
appointed by a President of a particular party does not cause judges to 
possess a particular ideology. Rather, it will correlate with the 
ideology that judges already possess, to the extent that Republican 
Presidents are more likely to appoint conservative Justices, and vice 
versa for Democratic Presidents.  
Second, it is obvious that party of appointment and other proxies 
can be rather crude measures of ideology. Few studies have 
attempted in a systematic way to estimate how well or poorly it 
captures ideology.112 Its failures, however, are sometimes highly 
visible: Justices Stevens and Scalia were both appointed by 
Republican Presidents, for example, but are viewed as occupying 
opposite ends of the ideological spectrum on the current Supreme 
Court. Scholars have offered a variety of reasons why the appointing-
party proxy may fall short in practice.113 Political actors may not be 
motivated entirely by ideological concerns when selecting judges;114 
even if they do care primarily about ideology, they may not have 
perfect knowledge of the ideology of those whom they appoint; and 
even if they know exactly how a candidate thinks today, they cannot 
necessarily predict how that candidate will behave twenty or thirty 
years from now.115  
A third problem with party of appointment, which has perhaps 
received less attention, is that its inherent inaccuracies produce 
results that are systematically biased toward understating the impact 
 
 112. See infra Part IV. 
 113. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 20 
(2007) (identifying various reasons why party of appointing President is a problematic measure 
of judicial ideology); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
83–84, 95–96 (2002). 
 114. See, e.g., David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479, 484–85 (2005) (noting that Presidents 
weigh a variety of factors, such as professional competence, political patronage, personal 
friendship, and electoral considerations, when selecting judicial nominees). 
 115. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 1519–20 (discussing the phenomenon of 
“ideological drift,” wherein the ideological preferences of Justices can shift in sometimes 
unexpected ways over time). 
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of ideology. As a means of estimating how much the ideology of 
judges affects their rulings, the appointing-party proxy is best 
interpreted as providing only a lower bound on ideology. For 
example, if Democratic appointees are 20% more likely to rule in a 
liberal direction in certain kinds of cases than Republican appointees, 
then clearly the identity of the judge must have an impact in at least 
20% of cases. However, since an estimate based on a party variable 
only measures the difference between the average Democratic 
appointee and the average Republican appointee, the proportion of 
cases in which the identity of the judge is likely to make a difference 
to the outcome will be much greater.  
To present a highly stylized example, assume that there are only 
two kinds of judges: “liberals,” who always vote in a liberal 
direction, and “conservatives,” who always vote in a conservative 
direction. Suppose that 80% of Republican appointees are 
“conservative” and 80% of Democratic appointees are “liberal.” Then 
a regression on the party of appointment will reveal that Democratic 
appointees choose the liberal outcome 80% of the time and 
Republican appointees choose the liberal outcome 20% of the time. 
This difference, however, clearly understates the impact of ideology, 
since the difference between “conservatives” and “liberals” is 100%. 
This tendency toward understated results is not specific to the 
appointing-party proxy, but rather applies to proxy variables in 
general: when a proxy for some underlying variable is used in a 
regression to predict some phenomenon, the results will typically 
understate the impact of the underlying variable on the phenomenon. 
This problem is known to statisticians as “attenuation bias.”116 
Fourth, while the dichotomous nature of party of appointment and 
other popular proxy variables such as race and sex makes them easy 
to interpret, that same simplicity also limits what they can be used to 
study. Most notably, they cannot capture gradations of ideology. 
Party of appointment can be used to identify aggregate differences 
between appointees of the two parties, but it cannot distinguish 
between moderate and extreme judges. Consider, for example, a 
study by Joel Waldfogel, who found that moderate district judges 
 
 116. E.g., JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND 
PANEL DATA 73–76 (2002). 
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were more likely to induce settlement than extreme district judges.117 
Such an effect could never have been identified using the appointing-
party proxy, since there is no way to identify moderates using only a 
dichotomous measure of ideology. 
Notwithstanding these caveats, there are a number of important 
lessons to be gleaned from regression analysis that uses party of 
appointment to predict judicial voting behavior. First, such analysis 
has refuted the formalistic notion that judicial decision-making is the 
result of legal reasoning untainted by the influence of ideology and 
other personal characteristics. If judges decide cases simply by 
applying legal principles in a neutral way, there is no reason why 
party of appointment should correlate with judicial outcomes. Yet it 
does. Second, analyses using party of appointment have yielded the 
practical knowledge that the outcomes of cases depend to a 
significant extent on both the characteristics of the judge and, in the 
case of multimember courts, the composition of the panel. Whatever 
doctrinal and normative legal scholars may have to say about how 
judges ought to decide cases, practicing lawyers and social scientists 
want to know how judges will in fact behave. In a world in which 
reliable, useful clues about future behavior can be difficult to obtain, 
party of appointment is a simple and readily available piece of 
information with real predictive value. Third, regressions on party of 
appointment can reveal the nature and extent of differences between 
the average Republican appointee and the average Democratic 
appointee. Such knowledge is clearly important for understanding the 
impact of presidential elections on the composition of the federal 
judiciary, and for understanding longer-term trends in the courts. 
b. Composite Proxy Measures 
The perceived inadequacies of party of appointment and other 
simple proxy measures have led some scholars to seek superior 
alternatives in the form of what we might call composite proxy 
measures.118 Proxy measures of this type strive for greater accuracy 
 
 117. See Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship Between Trial and 
Plaintiff Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229 (1995). 
 118. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 113, at 83–84, 95–96 (questioning the use of 
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by combining more than one type of information, or information 
from multiple sources, about the ideology of a given judge. 
Until recently, a composite measure of ideology known in the 
literature as the “Segal-Cover scores” was also the dominant proxy 
for ideology in studies of the United States Supreme Court.119 This 
measure was derived from newspaper editorials in four major 
newspapers on each Supreme Court nominee prior to confirmation. 
The Segal-Cover score measures the rate at which these editorials 
ascribe “liberal,” “moderate,” or “conservative” positions to the 
nominees.120 Like party-of-appointment and common space scores,121 
these measures have been shown to have a statistically significant 
correlation with the voting behavior of the Justices. Moreover, they 
are also predetermined—they are fixed at the moment of 
confirmation—so that the direction of causality is clear: the measures 
of ideology are predicting differences in voting behavior among the 
Justices. Nevertheless, these measures should not be viewed as causal 
in the traditional sense; newspaper editorials preceding a Justice’s 
confirmation do not have a direct impact on that Justice’s votes. As 
with other proxy variables, a Justice’s Segal-Cover score is 
correlated with the Justice’s ideology, which is the true causal 
variable. 
More recently, scholars have expressed enthusiasm for an 
ideology measure known as a “common space score” that combines a 
more precise estimate of presidential ideology with information about 
the preferences of home-state Senators to reflect the influence of the 
latter in the federal judicial appointments process.122 The common 
 
appointing party as a measure of ideology on the ground that it ignores crucial information that 
can help predict judicial behavior, and arguing in favor of the use of the “common space 
scores” devised by Giles et al., cited above in note 61).  
 119. See Segal & Cover, supra note 61. 
 120. See id. at 559–61. 
 121. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text (discussing the common space scores). 
 122. See Giles et al., supra note 61, at 627–31 (devising and explaining the common space 
scores); see also CROSS, supra note 113, at 19 (characterizing the Giles et al. common space 
scores as the “best currently available measure for circuit court judicial ideology” on account of 
the fact that they combine measures of both presidential and senatorial preference); Epstein & 
King, supra note 113, at 83–84, 95–96 (arguing in favor of using common space scores); Lee 
Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (rescaling the 
Martin-Quinn scores to correspond to the same space as the common space scores); infra Part 
IV.A.4 (discussing, and questioning, whether common space scores perform better in practice 
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space scores rely on sophisticated measures of senatorial and 
presidential ideology initially developed by political scientists Keith 
Poole and Howard Rosenthal.123 The Poole-Rosenthal scores locate 
Senators in a two-dimensional space on the basis of the positions that 
they take in roll call votes, but only the first of the two dimensions is 
salient for most purposes.124 The ideology scores of Presidents are 
then estimated along this same dimension based on the public 
positions that they take on bills before Congress.125 Using the Poole-
Rosenthal scores, Professors Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers proceed to 
assign ideology scores to federal judges as follows. First, if a judge 
has a single home-state Senator of the same party as the appointing 
President, the judge’s common space score is taken to be equal to that 
of the Senator. Second, if both home-state senators are of the same 
party as the President, then the judge’s common space score is the 
average of the two Senators’ scores. Third, if both home-state 
Senators are of the opposite party as the President, then the judge’s 
common space score is equal to that of the President.126 
This approach thus incorporates substantially more information 
about the political circumstances surrounding the selection of a judge 
than just the party affiliation of the appointing President. It accounts 
for the ideology of a judge’s home-state Senators, which is a 
statistically significant predictor of a judge’s voting behavior owing 
to the practice of senatorial courtesy.127 The scores also allow for the 
fact that Presidents and Senators of the same party vary in their 
ideological intensity, such that a Carter appointee is ordinarily 
presumed to be more liberal than a Clinton appointee, and so forth. 
The common space scores can therefore be characterized as a 
 
than the simpler alternative of party of appointing president). 
 123. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 12–30. 
 124. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 47, at 55–62; Giles et al., supra note 61, at 631 
(noting that the second of the two dimemsions in the Poole-Rosenthal scores rise to importance 
only “in a few historical eras”). 
 125. See Nolan M. McCarty & Keith T. Poole, Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical 
Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
282, 297–305 (1995). 
 126. See Giles et al., supra note 61, at 631. 
 127. See id.; Donald R. Songer & Martha Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact of 
Presidential and Home State Influences on Judicial Decisionmaking in the United States Courts 
of Appeals, 55 POL. RES. Q. 299, 302 (2002). 
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“composite proxy” for judicial ideology, in the sense that they 
combine multiple sources of information—in this case, information 
about the ideology of both the nominating President and the home-
state Senators who enjoy de facto veto power—to arrive at a measure 
of a judge’s ideological position.  
As with simpler proxy measures such as party of appointment, a 
major advantage of composite proxy variables is their ease of use: 
they are readily available, fixed at the time of appointment, and often 
correlate at least roughly with ideology. However, they are also 
harder to use than simple proxy measures: the results that they 
produce are less intuitive and more difficult to interpret. In a 
regression on party affiliation, for example, the results provide an 
estimate of the difference between the average Democrat and the 
average Republican. But the estimated effect of common space scores 
does not have a similarly straightforward interpretation. Although 
common space scores can be used quite easily to demonstrate that 
ideology is a statistically significant predictor of judicial voting, it is 
more challenging to interpret the magnitude of the effect of ideology 
when measured in this way. 
In theory, composite proxy measures such as the common space 
scores should compensate for their complexity by offering greater 
precision than simpler proxy measures. Surprisingly little is known, 
however, about their actual performance across different settings. It is 
unclear, for example, whether and under what conditions common 
space scores actually outperform party of appointment as a predictor 
of judicial voting.128 At the same time, composite proxy measures are 
subject to many of the same inherent limitations as simpler proxy 
measures. For example, the fact that common space scores are fixed 
at the time of confirmation means that they cannot account for 
changes in judicial ideology over time. As Martin, Quinn, and several 
coauthors have argued, many Supreme Court Justices “drift” 
ideologically during their time in office.129 No static proxy measure—
 
 128. Part IV of this Article compares the accuracy of the party proxy and common space 
scores using a data set of asylum adjudications. We find that common space scores provide a 
small improvement in predictive power, but arguably not enough of a difference to justify their 
use in light of the difficulties in interpretation. 
 129. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32; Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 1502–19. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:133 
 
 
no matter how carefully devised—can adequately explain votes by 
these drifting Justices throughout their entire careers.  
Other problems with proxy measures can arise when they are used 
in the positive political theory literature to study strategic interactions 
among judges, or between the judiciary and other institutions.130 For a 
variety of reasons, such studies often require the researcher to 
identify the median (or most liberal, or most conservative) judge on a 
court or panel. An easy way to do so is to choose the judge who has 
the median (or most liberal, or most conservative) proxy measure of 
ideology. Unfortunately, such an approach runs the risk of 
exacerbating measurement error: on top of the measurement error 
inherent in any proxy measure of a given judge’s ideology, there 
arises the further risk that one has simply selected the wrong judge. 
On a three-judge panel, for example, the judge with the median 
common space score may be the most likely to be the median judge, 
but will not necessarily be so. Nevertheless, several studies have 
sought to identify the median (most liberal or most conservative) 
judge on a court simply by singling out the judge with the median 
(most liberal or most conservative) proxy measure score.131  
2. Behavioral Measures 
Proxy methods have achieved such dominance in empirical 
studies of judicial behavior that it is easy to forget that alternatives 
exist. In fact, there is a large literature that has employed a variety of 
 
 130. See David S. Law, Introduction: Positive Political Theory and the Law, 15 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1–2 (2006) (describing the “positive political theory of law” 
approach to the study of how lawmakers behave). 
 131. See, e.g., CROSS, supra note 113, at 166, 172–75 (using common space scores to 
identify the median, most liberal, and most conservative judges on federal appeals court 
panels); Jennifer L. Peresie, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial Decisionmaking in 
the Federal Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759, 1772–73 nn.52–53 (2005) (using a rescaled version of 
the common space scores to identify the most liberal colleague on a given panel); see also 
VIRGINIA HETTINGER ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 50–51 (2006) (using absolute 
value of difference between common space scores as a proxy for ideological distance between 
judges on a panel); cf. Lee Epstein & Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 261, 275–77 (1996) (describing the failure of the Segal-Cover scores to identify the 
median Justice for most terms); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1295–96 (2005) (specifically noting the probability that 
the Justice with the median score is in fact the median). 
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empirical methods to estimate the ideology of judges on an individual 
basis from their actual voting behavior. Whereas proxy measures of 
ideology rely upon generalizations from a judge’s characteristics, 
behavioral measures of ideology demand observation of each judge’s 
actual behavior.132 Notwithstanding how common such approaches 
have been in practice, however, the scholarly literature has failed to 
depict them as offering an integrated and coherent alternative to 
proxy-based measurement approaches. One reason is that the relevant 
literature spans a wide range of topics and disciplines over a long 
period of time. Behavioral assessment of judicial ideology is an 
intellectually diverse tradition that ranges from much of the political 
science literature on the Supreme Court, to pioneering work from the 
earliest years of quantitative judicial politics, criminal sentencing, 
and empirical law and economics. Consequently, it is all too easy for 
scholars with a substantive interest in one area to remain unaware of 
what methods have been attempted or developed in another area. 
Another reason that behavioral assessment remains poorly 
understood is that the relevant methods vary greatly in their 
sophistication and ambition. As a result, it is easy to lose sight of the 
fact that they belong to the same family of measurement approaches. 
At one extreme lies simple vote-counting: one can arrive at a rough 
assessment of a specific judge’s ideological preferences in a 
particular context—for example, criminal law or asylum law—simply 
by calculating the proportion of the time that the judge in question 
has actually voted in favor of the defendant or asylum seeker. At the 
opposite extreme lies dynamic ideal point estimation of the type 
performed by Professors Martin and Quinn, who employ modern 
computing power and Bayesian simulation techniques to arrive at 
estimates of the Justices’ “ideal points” that vary over time.133 Their 
approach exploits the information conveyed by voting alignments in 
actual Supreme Court cases to determine where the Justices stand 
relative to one another. Owing to its methodological sophistication, 
their model can estimate the extent to which a given Justice’s 
ideological preferences have drifted over time, for example, or the 
 
 132. Credit belongs to Lewis Kornhauser for suggesting the “behavioral measure” 
terminology. 
 133. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32. 
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probability that a particular Justice was the ideological median of the 
Court at a given point in time. 
Regardless of how it is implemented, the fundamental advantages 
and limitations of behavioral assessment remain largely the same. Its 
primary advantage is that it avoids the measurement error associated 
with proxy variables. Depending upon the proxy that is used, this 
measurement error may be severe: party of appointing president, for 
instance, is only roughly correlated with judicial behavior. Moreover, 
it can be difficult to know how severe this measurement error is, and 
how much it biases the results of a study. By contrast, even though 
one cannot perfectly ascertain a judge’s ideology from his or her 
behavior, at least the extent of the measurement error can be inferred 
using standard statistical techniques. The primary disadvantage of 
behavioral assessment is that it can only be used on data that contains 
a relatively large number of observations per judge. If a judge only 
appears once in a data set, it is fruitless to try to draw any direct 
inference about his or her preferences. In such situations, it is 
necessary to resort to proxy methods, which remain capable of 
revealing aggregate differences in voting by party or other 
characteristics. 
Scholars have, on occasion, rejected the behavioral-assessment 
approach for reasons that are not justified. There are, in particular, 
two misconceptions about the approach that have found their way 
into the judicial behavior literature. One common misconception is 
that proxy measures must be used because ideology itself is 
unobservable.134 The whole point of statistical inference as a 
scientific discipline, however, is to draw reliable inferences about 
unobservable (or “latent”) variables from whatever data can in fact be 
observed. There exists no “direct measure” of the extent to which 
judges appointed by a Democratic President are liberal, any more 
than there exists a “direct measure” of each judge’s true ideology. 
The problem is not that judges’ ideologies are latent variables; they 
are no more or less observable than any other variable to be estimated 
 
 134. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Ideology, Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to 
Chief Judge Harry I. Edwards, 85 VA. L. REV. 805, 823–24 (1999) (arguing that because there 
exists no “direct measure of the ideology held by each of the D.C. Circuit judges at the time of 
their appointment . . . there is no alternative but to rely on some proxy for ideology”). 
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in a statistical model. The problem is, rather, that the methods 
involved in estimating the ideology of individual judges from their 
voting behavior can be more complicated than simply running 
regressions on party affiliation. 
The second common misconception about the behavioral-
assessment approach is that it is circular to rely upon estimates of a 
judge’s ideology that are derived from his or her actual votes. 
Professors Segal and Cover have stated this objection plainly: “One 
cannot demonstrate that attitudes affect votes when the attitudes are 
operationalized from those same votes.”135 Certainly, it would be 
circular to estimate judges’ ideologies from a data set of decisions, 
then use those ideology estimates to “predict” the same votes. But the 
purpose of most empirical research on courts is not merely to predict 
actual voting; it is instead to test hypotheses about why judges and 
litigants behave the way they do.136 Behavioral-assessment models 
are often well-suited to testing hypotheses of this variety.137  
At the same time that the limitations of behavioral assessment 
have at times been exaggerated, its advantages over a proxy-based 
approach have not always been fully appreciated. A behavioral 
approach often succeeds where traditional proxy methods are simply 
incapable of producing useful measurements of judicial ideology or 
testing hypotheses about judicial behavior. Although a complete 
survey of the literature is not possible here, a few examples should 
illustrate the point. One simple application that requires estimation of 
judicial ideology on an individualized basis from actual behavior is 
the study of inter-judge disparities. Ever since the Legal Realists 
argued that judicial decisions depend heavily upon the personal 
 
 135. Segal & Cover, supra note 61, at 558; see also Martin et al., supra note 131, at 1295–
96. 
 136. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary 
Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 592 (2003) (observing that, contrary to what “the traditional 
attitudinalists have sometimes suggested,” “there is nothing ‘tautological’ about seeking to 
ascertain a Justice’s preferences by examining his or her voting record and opinions as a 
Justice,” and characterizing “each decision of the Court” as a source of “information” from 
which generalizations about the “revealed beliefs and attitudes of the Justices” can be drawn). 
 137. If a hypothesis can be formulated as a relationship between latent variables, those 
variables can be included in the behavioral-assessment model, and that hypothesis can then be 
tested at the same time as the ideology estimates are generated using the same model. For 
examples of such work, see notes 138–51 and accompanying text below. 
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preferences of the judge, researchers have long sought to measure the 
differences between judges. One of the earliest known empirical 
studies of judges, published in 1933, uses behavioral assessment to 
compare the rates at which six New Jersey trial judges imposed 
sentences of imprisonment in criminal cases assigned to them 
randomly from the same pool.138 Although the statistical analysis was 
rudimentary, the differences reported were large and statistically 
significant: the imprisonment rates among the judges varied from 
34% to 58%, in a data set of over 7,000 cases.139 
Methods that examine the behavior of individual judges are also 
necessary to measure changes in inter-judge disparity over time. For 
example, Anderson, Kling, and Stith estimate the impact of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines on inter-judge sentencing disparities 
within district courts.140 Exploiting the fact that cases are randomly 
assigned within districts, they treat the judge assigned to each case as 
a “random effect” that influences the sentence imposed on the 
defendant.141 Using a sophisticated model that can precisely estimate 
the distribution of these judge effects, they can estimate the extent to 
which inter-judge sentencing disparities decreased following the 
imposition of the guidelines.142 Such an estimate would be impossible 
to derive using a proxy-based approach to the measurement of 
judicial ideology. Although it might be possible to estimate a lower 
bound on sentencing disparity by estimating the difference between 
the average Democratic judge and the average Republican judge, it 
would be impossible to draw any conclusions about changes in inter-
judge disparity over time. Suppose that one were to observe that the 
estimated impact of party affiliation on sentence length decreased 
following adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines. There are two 
competing ways of explaining such a finding: it is possible either that 
inter-judge disparity decreased without regard to party affiliation, or 
that inter-judge disparity stayed the same while the correlation 
 
 138. Frederick J. Gaudet et al., Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of 
Judges, 23 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 811 (1933). 
 139. Id. at 816. 
 140. See, e.g., James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: 
Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999). 
 141. Id. at 290–92. 
 142. Id. at 279–87. 
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between party affiliation and sentencing behavior weakened.143 
Without some way of measuring the ideology of individual judges, it 
would be impossible to identify the correct explanation. 
Measurement of judicial ideology on an individualized basis may 
also be indispensable to successful empirical work when ideology has 
a subtle, nonlinear, or otherwise complex impact on outcomes. 
Professor Waldfogel’s study144 of settlement bargaining in the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York illustrates the 
point. His paper tests one empirical implication of the Priest-Klein 
hypothesis145—namely, that cases assigned to moderate judges are 
more likely to be litigated, while cases assigned to more extreme 
judges, be they highly liberal or highly conservative, are more likely 
to be settled.146 By comparing settlement and decision rates among 
litigated cases for each judge, he identifies a clear but nonlinear 
relationship between ideology and settlement rates that confirms the 
hypothesis.147 Although this finding is interesting in its own right, 
what matters from a methodological perspective is that Professor 
Waldfogel could not have tested this hypothesis at all had he relied 
upon a dichotomous proxy measure of ideology that merely 
distinguished liberals and conservatives, such as party of appointing 
president. His research question required him to distinguish not 
simply between liberals and conservatives, but also between liberals 
and conservatives, on the one hand, and moderates, on the other. 
Moreover, although it is conceivable that he could have executed his 
study using a continuous proxy measure capable of capturing the 
difference between moderate and extreme judges, such as the 
common space scores, the extra measurement error inherent in proxy 
measures might well have obscured the results that emerged clearly 
from examination of each judge’s behavior. 
 
 143. Of course, any combination of these two explanations is also possible. 
 144. Waldfogel, supra note 117. 
 145. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 146. Waldfogel, supra note 117, at 299–30. In this context, the ideological spectrum can be 
conceived as a continuum from pro-plaintiff to pro-defendant attitudes; an “extreme” judge 
would exhibit a strong tendency to favor plaintiffs or defendants in certain categories of civil 
cases, while a “moderate” judge would exhibit neither tendency. 
 147. See id. at 242–45. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
182 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 29:133 
 
 
Individualized behavioral assessment of judicial ideology is also 
likely to prove helpful when the dimensionality of judicial 
preferences is at issue. For example, in a recent study, Professor 
Farnsworth examined votes by Supreme Court Justices in two 
different types of criminal appeals, constitutional and statutory.148 
Among the nonunanimous decisions that he studied, he found a 
striking pattern: each of the Justices was almost exactly as likely to 
vote in a pro-defendant fashion in the statutory cases as in the 
constitutional cases, notwithstanding the very different substantive 
questions and legal materials at stake.149 Overall, their voting patterns 
across the two types of criminal appeals were 97% correlated with 
one another.150 This near-perfect correlation enables us to draw two 
important inferences about how the Justices vote in criminal cases. 
First, they appear to be guided by the same set of policy views or 
attitudes in constitutional cases as in statutory cases. Second, their 
decision-making appears to be driven more by these policy views or 
attitudes than by the very significant differences in formal character 
and content that exist between constitutional and statutory rules. 
Notably, Professor Farnsworth’s study did not require him to 
perform any regressions or complex statistical analyses; nor did he 
have to resort to any technically sophisticated measures of 
ideology.151 What he did have to do, however, was to assess each 
Justice’s voting tendencies in both types of criminal appeals. By 
doing so, he was able to discern that the ideology of the Justices can 
be captured by a single dimension in both types of criminal appeals: a 
Justice’s ideological propensity to vote in favor of the criminal 
defendant is not neutralized or outweighed by any conflicting set of 
preferences having to do with the type of legal claim involved. Yet 
there was no way of determining that the Justices hold 
unidimensional ideological preferences in all criminal cases without 
 
 148. Ward Farnsworth, Signatures of Ideology: The Case of the Supreme Court’s Criminal 
Docket, 104 MICH. L. REV. 67, 68 (2005). 
 149. Id. at 70. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id.; see also Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence 
from the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1083 (2006) (showing similar correlations 
for circuit court judges in non-unanimous cases). 
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assessing the pro-defendant voting tendencies of each Justice in each 
category of cases. 
3. Transplanted Measures 
A third approach to measuring judicial ideology for purposes of 
empirical research is to transplant behavioral measures derived from 
one context into new applications. Because these measures are 
derived from judges’ voting behavior, they are likely to be more 
accurate than proxy variables derived purely from political or 
demographic variables. It is also possible to construct such measures 
that may vary over time, reflecting the ideological “drift” that may 
occur over long judicial careers.152 In addition, such ideology scores 
can be easily used in regression analysis, without any need for 
sophisticated modeling on the part of the researcher. 
Although these “transplanted measures” seem to offer the best of 
both worlds—combining much of the precision of behavioral 
assessment with the simplicity of proxy variables—they are also easy 
to misuse. The most fundamental concern is that of circularity: such 
measures should not be used to explain voting behavior in the same 
data set that was used to derive them.153 If the ideology measures are 
derived from the same cases being examined, it would be impossible 
to conclude that ideology had a causal effect on voting behavior. As 
Professors Epstein and Mershon put it: “To measure the political 
preferences of legislators by their votes at year 1 and, then, to use 
those very votes to explain their behavior at year 1 is to argue that 
legislators vote the way they do because they vote the way they 
do.”154  
A second trap for the unwary is that all behavioral measures of 
judicial ideology are derived under specific assumptions that may be 
inapplicable or inappropriate to the context in which a later 
researcher wishes to apply them. For example, if the ideology scores 
are derived from a model that assumes sincere voting, it would be 
inappropriate to use these scores to test a hypothesis that involves 
 
 152. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32, at 135; Epstein et al., supra note 64, at 1502–04. 
 153. See infra notes 175–77 and accompanying text. 
 154. Epstein & Mershon, supra note 131, at 262. 
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strategic voting. Similarly, if estimates of judicial ideology are 
derived from a model that employs agnostic coding of case outcomes, 
one must be careful when using these measures to predict outcomes 
in particular areas of law. Suppose, for instance, that an agnostically 
derived measure of ideology identifies a particular judge as liberal. 
Such a measure cannot necessarily be used to test the hypothesis that 
the judge voted in a liberal fashion in any specific area of law, such 
as securities fraud.155 The judge’s ideology may be multidimensional, 
such that she is liberal in all areas except securities fraud.156 
Alternatively, the researcher’s definition of what it means to be 
“liberal” in this context could itself be problematic: a “liberal” judge 
could conceivably be animated in such cases by solicitude for the 
rights of defendants, or instead by hostility toward wealthy 
executives who enrich themselves at the expense of employee 
pension funds and small investors, or by some amalgam of 
conflicting impulses. A researcher who nevertheless uses an 
agnostically derived measure of ideology to predict the judge’s votes 
in securities fraud cases thus runs the risk of concluding incorrectly 
that ideology is a weak predictor when, in fact, the measure may not 
accurately reflect the judge’s ideology in this area, or the researcher 
may have an understanding of what it means to be liberal in a 
particular context that is inconsistent with how liberal judges actually 
think. 
Transplanted measures vary greatly in their conceptual and 
technical complexity. The simplest variety of such measures—
namely, a judge’s past voting record—may not, at first glance, seem 
like a transplanted measure at all. To use a judge’s past voting record 
on a particular issue to measure the current ideological preferences of 
that same judge on the same issue, however, is in fact to engage in a 
form of transplantation: one is using data from one context, that of 
the past, to shed light upon the judge’s state of mind in a different 
context, that of the present. Research supports the intuition that a 
 
 155. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 156. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 53–59 (discussing the problems involved in 
measuring the ideology of Canadian Supreme Court Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, whose 
agnostically derived ideology score identifies her as conservative, despite her very liberal 
voting record in labor and aboriginal cases). 
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judge’s past voting record should be an excellent predictor of his or 
her future voting behavior: one study has found, for example, that 
past voting behavior is a better predictor of future voting by Supreme 
Court Justices in many areas of case law than the Segal-Cover 
scores.157 A judge’s voting history is by no means, however, a 
foolproof measure of his or her ideological tendencies in today’s 
cases. It will be accurate only if a judge’s ideology is stable over 
time, and if the questions that the judge faces now are no more likely 
to elicit conservative or liberal behavior than the questions he or she 
faced in the past.158 
Among the most commonly used transplanted measures of 
ideology are the Martin-Quinn scores.159 These scores are estimated 
from a one-dimensional model of voting using data from all Supreme 
Court cases decided since 1953.160 Professors Martin and Quinn 
employ an agnostic coding methodology, meaning that the ideology 
measures are derived from voting alignments, rather than outcomes. 
Consequently, all unanimous opinions in the Supreme Court are 
dropped from the analysis.161 A noteworthy strength of the Martin-
Quinn approach is that it allows for, and seeks to capture, ideological 
movement or “drift” over time on the part of the Justices. 
Nevertheless, their approach still has its limitations. Perhaps most 
significantly, it assumes sincere voting on the part of the Justices, 
notwithstanding the evidence that Justices can and do vote 
strategically.162  
Another criticism that has been leveled against their approach is 
that it is unable to distinguish between changes in the ideology of the 
Justices and changes in the composition of the Supreme Court’s 
agenda over time.163 Consider two scenarios: one in which all of the 
 
 157. See Epstein & Mershon, supra note 131, at 275. 
 158. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 15, at 320–21; Symposium, The Supreme Court and 
the Attitudinal Model, 4 L. & CTS. 3, 3–5 (1994). 
 159. See generally Martin & Quinn, supra note 32. 
 160. Id. at 138. 
 161. See id. at 145. 
 162. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); 
MALTZMAN ET AL., supra note 16; WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 
(1964). 
 163. See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and 
Institutions for the Court, Congress, and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 436 (2007). 
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Justices drift to the right, and another in which the Justices do not 
change, but the Court’s docket consists increasingly of cases that are 
inherently easier for legal and factual reasons to decide in a 
conservative direction. Both scenarios could conceivably produce 
exactly the same set of voting alignments. Thus, an approach that 
relies exclusively upon data on voting alignments cannot distinguish 
the two scenarios. 
Professors Martin and Quinn do not resolve this particular 
problem; instead, they assume that the ideological characteristics of 
the agenda, as opposed to those of the Justices, are static.164 Yet most 
scholars would likely agree that the Court’s agenda does indeed 
change over time: one might plausibly suspect, for example, that the 
Rehnquist Court heard more cases that push doctrine in a 
conservative direction than the Burger Court. The inability of the 
Martin-Quinn approach to model changes in the Court’s agenda is 
therefore likely to distort comparisons between Justices from 
different time periods and may, in particular, fail to capture the full 
extent to which the Court has shifted to the right over time. 
To solve the problem, Professor Bailey has devised an alternative 
approach that bears some similarities to the Martin-Quinn model but 
also attempts to incorporate agenda change. Bailey’s solution is to 
exploit “bridge observations”—namely, cases that were decided by 
the Court at different times, but which posed the same legal issue.165 
In effect, he attempts to control for differences in the Court’s agenda 
over time by identifying cases that posed comparable questions at 
different points in the Court’s history: for example, under his 
approach, the voting behavior of the Justices who participated in Roe 
v. Wade166 is directly compared with that of the different set of 
Justices who participated in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.167 By 
comparing how Justices at different times vote in response to the 
same question or issue, his approach seeks to obtain crucial 
information about the extent to which the agenda, as opposed to the 
 
 164. The authors do not make this assumption explicitly, but it follows from the fact that 
the case parameters are drawn from a static distribution, whereas the Justices’ ideal points are 
generated through a dynamic process. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32, at 139–40. 
 165. See Bailey, supra note 163, at 438–40. 
 166. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 167. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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Justices, has evolved over time. Using the same approach, Bailey 
further attempts to estimate ideology scores that are comparable 
across institutions. He does so by identifying bridge observations that 
span the Supreme Court, Congress, and the White House, in the form 
of issues and cases that were the subject of disagreement among the 
three branches.168 Thus, at least in theory, the Bailey scores hold the 
promise of more accurate comparisons of ideology over time, and 
even across branches of government, than the Martin-Quinn scores. It 
remains the case, however, that neither measure accounts for the 
possibility of strategic voting. 
The Martin-Quinn and Bailey measures have proved to be 
immensely useful to researchers on account of their accuracy and 
ease of use. Both sets of scores seem largely consistent with 
commonly held conceptions of where various Justices have stood, but 
closer examination does reveal a number of anomalies. For example, 
the Martin-Quinn scores show that the Supreme Court had its most 
conservative median during the 1972 Term169—the same Term in 
which it legalized abortion by a 7–2 vote in Roe v. Wade,170 and only 
one Term after it had struck down the death penalty in Furman v. 
Georgia.171 The Martin-Quinn scores also indicate, however, that the 
Court median was far more liberal in 2004 than in 1972.172 There 
may be few propositions on which the entire American constitutional 
law professoriate can agree, but we suspect that if one were to ask 
each of them in which Term the Court was more conservative, they 
would overwhelmingly agree that it was in 2004. By contrast, the 
Bailey scores show that the Court gradually became more 
conservative since 1973, consistent with conventional wisdom.173 Yet 
Bailey’s approach yields its own anomalies as well: for instance, his 
estimates indicate that neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas was 
to the right of Justice Rehnquist in any year that they served together 
on the Court.174 If there is any other proposition on which the 
 
 168. See Bailey, supra note 163, at 438–40. 
 169. See id. at 436. 
 170. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 171. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 172. See Bailey, supra note 163, at 436. 
 173. Id. at 444. 
 174. See MICHAEL A. BAILEY, IDEAL POINT DATA (2007), http://www9.georgetown.edu/ 
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constitutional law professoriate would agree, it would surely be that 
Justices Scalia and Thomas were in fact the most conservative 
members of the Rehnquist Court. 
Like any transplanted measure, the Martin-Quinn and Bailey 
scores must be used with caution in regression analysis. In many 
applications, there is a potential for circularity against which scholars 
have warned in the past: some, if not all, of the cases being studied 
will also have been used to derive the scores themselves.175 Martin 
and Quinn have argued that circularity of this type will not be a 
meaningful problem as long as the cases being analyzed constitute 
only a small fraction of the data used to calculate the scores in the 
first place.176 Neither the extent nor the substantive impact of 
circularity in any given study, however, will be easy for readers to 
assess. An obvious but demanding solution in such situations is 
simply to estimate a set of scores using the Martin-Quinn or Bailey 
methodology but omitting the cases under study.177 
A second issue with sophisticated measures of the Martin-Quinn 
or Bailey variety is that they are easily misinterpreted. Some studies, 
for example, have sought to measure the ideological “distance” 
between Justices simply by calculating the difference between their 
Martin-Quinn scores.178 Unlike simpler measures of ideology that are 
commonly used in the empirical literature, however, the Martin-
Quinn and Bailey ideology scores are reported on numerical scales 
that have no natural interpretation. For example, the “distance” 
between Justices Alito and Thomas as measured by the difference in 
their Martin-Quinn scores as of the 2006 Term was 2.845, while the 
 
faculty/baileyma/Data.htm (follow “Ideal Points” hyperlink) (online appendix to Bailey, supra 
note 163).  
 175. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Can Ideal Point Estimates Be Used as 
Explanatory Variables? 2–3 (Oct. 3, 2005), http://mqscores.wustl.edu/media/resnote.pdf. 
 177. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only 
Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 55–56 n.241, 90 n.363 (2005); Matthew Sag et al., 
Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property—An Empirical Study, CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009). 
 178. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 74–81 
(2008) (using the difference between Justices’ Martin-Quinn scores as a measure of ideological 
disagreement); Nancy Staudt et al., On the Role of Ideological Homogeneity in Generating 
Consequential Constitutional Decisions, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 361, 377 (2008) (using the 
standard deviation of Martin-Quinn scores to measure ideological homogeneity). 
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“distance” between Justices Alito and Souter was 2.871. Although 
these figures are almost identical, most observers would likely agree 
that Justice Alito is ideologically closer to Justice Thomas than to 
Justice Souter.179 The ideological “distances” that one obtains by 
subtracting one score from another are misleading for the simple 
reason that the scale employed by the Martin-Quinn scores is not 
linear, but rather reports larger differences in scores at both extremes.  
A third problem is that the Martin-Quinn and Bailey scores cannot 
be used to test or challenge the very assumptions upon which they are 
based. Most notably, both the Martin-Quinn and Bailey scores are 
estimated on the assumption that the Justices sincerely vote their 
ideological preferences. It is therefore inappropriate to use them to 
test hypotheses about strategic behavior or models that assume 
strategic behavior. This problem can arise, for example, when 
scholars seek to test models of interaction between the judiciary and 
other branches of government. Various studies have tackled the 
question of whether the Supreme Court is constrained by Congress in 
statutory or constitutional cases, such that it behaves more cautiously 
than it would otherwise do in anticipation of how Congress might 
react.180 Suppose that the Justices do in fact feel constrained by the 
potential reactions of a conservative Congress and respond 
strategically by tacking to the right. In this situation, the influence of 
a conservative Congress might manifest itself in the Martin-Quinn or 
Bailey scores in the form of an ideological “drift” to the right on the 
part of the Justices. If so, however, then it would be inappropriate to 
use either set of scores to control for judicial ideology in a 
multivariate regression that seeks to isolate the effect of Congress on 
the behavior of the Court.181 The strategic response of the Justices to 
the conservatism of Congress may already be reflected to some 
 
 179. In the 2006 term, Justice Alito agreed with Justice Thomas 71% of the time in non-
unanimous cases, but agreed with Justice Souter only 44% of the time. These figures were 
computed from the Spaeth database, cited above in note 69, with analu = 0 and dec_type = 1 or 
7. 
 180. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Harvey & Friedman, supra note 65, at 548 (using Bailey scores to measure 
ideology in a study of strategic voting); Sala & Spriggs, supra note 27, at 203 (using Martin-
Quinn scores in a study of strategic voting). Both studies also report alternative estimates based 
on static ideology scores.  
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degree in their ideology scores. To include a control variable that 
(unbeknownst to the researcher) already reflects strategic reaction to 
congressional restraint is to run the risk of concluding falsely that the 
Court does not respond to congressional restraint. 
A preferable approach is to construct a purpose-built ideology 
measure that is tailored to the study at hand and does not embody an 
answer to the very question that the researcher intends to test. Thus, 
for example, to test whether the Supreme Court is more constrained 
in matters of statutory interpretation when it faces a hostile Congress, 
Professor Segal constructs a novel measure of ideology that is 
specifically suited for his task: he derives a measure of the Justices’ 
ideology solely from their voting behavior in constitutional cases.182 
If one is willing to assume that the Court is constrained by Congress 
only in statutory cases and not in constitutional ones, this measure 
offers an appropriate baseline for measuring the ideological 
preferences of the Justices in the absence of congressional constraint. 
Similarly, Professors Epstein, Ho, King, and Segal construct a 
custom measure of judicial ideology to examine the impact of an 
ongoing war on the Supreme Court’s decision-making in civil 
liberties cases.183 It would be inappropriate to use the Martin-Quinn 
scores to control for the impact of judicial ideology because the 
scores are estimated in large part from the very civil liberties cases 
that the authors are studying. Consequently, the authors employ two 
alternative measures of judicial ideology—the Segal-Cover Scores, 
which are static and do not depend upon the actual voting behavior of 
the Justices, and a set of scores calculated using the Martin-Quinn 
algorithm, but from a subset of cases that includes no civil liberties 
decisions. 
IV. COMPARISON OF MEASUREMENT METHODS 
Although there are a wide variety of methods available for 
measuring ideology, surprisingly little research has been done to 
 
 182. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of 
Congress and the Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997); see also Bergara et al., supra note 
65, at 247–80 (employing Segal’s ideology measure in an alternative econometric model to 
criticize his conclusions). 
 183. See Epstein et al., supra note 177, at 90 n.363. 
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assess their strengths and weaknesses.184 In this Part, we compare a 
few of the measurement approaches that have proven most popular in 
the empirical literature on the Supreme Court and the federal courts 
of appeals. Our goal is not to compare all available measures, but 
rather to demonstrate the difficulties involved in choosing and 
employing a measure of ideology that is appropriate to a particular 
context. It is hoped that our demonstrations will prove useful both to 
researchers with a methodological interest in the design of 
quantitative studies, and to readers who wish to understand the 
limitations of such studies. 
A. How Different Methods Perform When Applied to the Federal 
Courts of Appeals 
Our application of different measurement methods to the courts of 
appeals will make use of two separate contributions by each of the 
authors of this Article. We will compare the performance of three 
different approaches to the measurement of judicial ideology on the 
courts of appeals using Law’s data set of asylum adjudications in the 
Ninth Circuit.185 First, we examine decision-making in the asylum 
cases using party of appointing president as a proxy for ideology. 
Next, we analyze the same data using another proxy measure, the 
“judicial common space” scores.186 The third measurement approach 
that we consider is a behavioral approach, Fischman’s “consensus 
voting” model, which estimates the ideology of each judge from his 
or her voting behavior while also accounting for the influence of 
collegial interaction in multi-member courts.187 
 
 184. E.g., Sisk & Heise, supra note 94, at 787–90; see also Epstein & Mershon, supra note 
131, at 262. 
 185. See David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum 
Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817 (2005) [hereinafter Law, Strategic Judicial 
Lawmaking]; David S. Law, Judicial Ideology and the Decision to Publish: Voting and 
Publication Patterns in Ninth Circuit Asylum Cases, 89 JUDICATURE 212 (2006). 
 186. See supra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. Common space scores for circuit 
court judges are available at http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2009). We thank Lee Epstein for making this data available. 
 187. See Fischman, supra note 88. Although a full treatment of the underlying model is 
beyond the scope of this Article, it assumes that judges vary along an underlying ideological 
dimension that ranges from completely pro-asylum to completely anti-asylum. It further 
assumes that judges incur disutility from dissenting, and it modifies its prediction of how each 
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1. Description and Initial Exploration of the Data  
The data set contains all 1,892 asylum appeals decided by 
ordinary three-judge panels of the Ninth Circuit from 1992 through 
2001.188 Judges were deemed to have voted in a “pro-asylum” 
direction if they joined an opinion that favored any kind of relief for 
the asylum petitioner; otherwise, their votes were deemed to be “anti-
asylum.” As coded in this manner, 18% of the votes cast were pro-
asylum, while 82% were anti-asylum. Forty-eight percent of all 
judicial votes in the data set were cast by Democratic appointees and 
52% by Republican appointees. The overwhelming majority of the 
cases were decided unanimously (95%) and without a published 
opinion (92%).189 
Table 1 illustrates the relationship between party of appointment 
and judicial voting. It reports the rates at which judges cast pro-
asylum votes, broken down by the appointing party of both the voting 
judge and his or her colleagues. It should be immediately evident that 
party of appointment is strongly associated with voting behavior in 
asylum cases: the average Democratic appointee is 13% more likely 
to vote in favor of relief than the average Republican appointee. The 
party of appointment of a judge’s colleagues also has a large impact 
on how he or she will vote. Republican appointees have a 6% pro-
asylum voting rate when sitting on all-Republican panels, but that 
rate rises to 20% when they sit with two Democratic appointees. 
Similarly, Democratic appointees exhibit a 15% pro-asylum voting 
rate when no other judge on the panel is a Democratic appointee, 
which increases to 25% when both of the judge’s colleagues are 
fellow Democrats. 
 
judge will vote to reflect this “cost of dissent.” The model yields estimates of each judge’s 
ideology as well as the cost of dissent, which can then be used to predict the probability of a 
pro-asylum vote for each judge on a panel. See id. 
 188. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking, supra note 185, at 832. 
 189. See id. at 817, 855. 
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TABLE 1: PERCENTAGE OF PRO-ASYLUM VOTES CAST 
 No panel 
colleagues are 
Democratic 
appointees  
One panel 
colleague is a 
Democratic 
appointee 
Both panel 
colleagues are 
Democratic 
appointees 
Average 
across all 
scenarios
Republican appointee 6% 12% 20% 12% 
Democratic appointee 15% 25% 35% 25% 
Average across all judges  10% 18% 27% 18% 
 
The fact that party of appointment is correlated with how judges 
vote in certain types of cases does not necessarily mean, however, 
that it is an accurate measure of judicial ideology. To be sure, it is 
indispensable for certain purposes. If, for example, our goal were to 
evaluate the impact that changes in control of the White House have 
on the ideological direction of the federal courts,190 then it would be 
both obvious and appropriate to study the relationship between party 
of appointment and judicial voting. But suppose instead that our goal 
is to understand the extent to which the ideological composition of a 
panel affects how judges vote. In that case, we would be interested 
not in the impact of appointing party per se, but rather in the impact 
of the actual ideology of the judges, for which appointing party is 
merely an imperfect proxy. As explained above in Part III.B.1, a 
proxy measure such as party of appointment that is imperfectly 
correlated with the underlying variable of interest—in this case, 
judicial ideology—will tend to understate the true impact of the 
underlying variable.191 A minority of Republican appointees may be 
relatively liberal; likewise, some fraction of Democratic appointees 
may in fact be somewhat conservative. Both a liberal Republican 
appointee who votes liberally and a conservative Democratic 
appointee who votes conservatively are behaving ideologically. If 
one uses party of appointment to measure their ideology, however, 
one will mistakenly conclude that neither judge is voting his or her 
 
 190. See DEBORAH J. BARROW ET AL., THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE 12 (1996) (reporting that “[t]he combination of new positions and swelling numbers of 
vacancies, owing especially to retirements,” has “enabled modern presidents to change 
anywhere from 35 to 60 percent of the membership on the lower federal courts during their stay 
in office”). 
 191. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
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ideological preferences. The result will be a systematic failure to 
capture the full impact of ideology. 
2. Regression Analysis and Goodness-of-Fit Comparison 
We evaluated the performance of the three measurement 
approaches at issue—namely, party of appointing president, judicial 
common space scores, and Fischman’s consensus voting model—by 
performing three regressions. In all three regressions, the dependent 
variable was the direction (either pro-asylum or anti-asylum) of a 
particular judge’s vote in a given case. The regressions on appointing 
party and common space scores were estimated using a random-
effects probit model, which is well-suited for data with dichotomous 
outcomes and also accounts for the fact that the three judges on a 
panel may be influenced by unobserved factors specific to each 
case.192 Such factors might include, for example, facts about the 
asylum petitioner or claim that were known to the judges but are 
unavailable to the researcher. 
In the first two regressions, the independent variables were the 
ideology measure of the judge casting the vote in question and a 
measure of the ideology of the other two judges on the panel. The 
ideology scores of the judge’s colleagues were included in order to 
 
 192. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 485–86 (2002). The random effects assumption 
is justified by the fact that cases are randomly assigned to panels. Many papers in the empirical 
literature on the courts of appeals have employed regression models, typically logit or probit, 
that make the implausible assumption that the three votes in each case are independent. See, 
e.g., Revesz, supra note 38, at 1767; Cross & Tiller, supra note 39, at 2169–70; Sunstein et al., 
supra note 103, at 316 n.40. Although such models will still estimate the regression coefficients 
correctly, the standard errors may be incorrect unless clustered. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 
116, at 482; Sag et al., supra note 177. However, for the purpose of estimating probabilities of 
particular outcomes, rather than merely estimating regression coefficients, the random effects 
model is more appropriate. As a robustness check, we also estimated the regressions in this 
paper using a plain probit model, and the results were very similar. 
 The random-effects probit regression on the common space scores takes the form:  
Pr(Pro-asylum vote by judge i in case n) = Φ[b1CSi + b2(CSj + CSk) + cn], 
where CSi denotes the common space score of judge i, CSj and CSk denote the common space 
scores of the other two judges on the panel, cn is a normally distributed random effect, b1 and b2 
are coefficients to be estimated, and Φ denotes the cumulative density function of the normal 
distribution. The regression on the party proxy uses a party indicator in place of the common 
space scores.  
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account for the collegial nature of panel voting. Circuit court panels 
are commonly thought to operate under a “norm of consensus” such 
that, all other things being equal, judges are generally reluctant to 
dissent, especially in low-profile cases.193 Thus, the ideology of a 
judge’s colleagues may influence his or her vote. In the first 
regression, the ideology of the voting judge was coded as a “1” if he 
or she was appointed by a Democratic President and “0” otherwise. 
The measure of the ideology of the other judges on the panel was 
simply the number of Democratic appointees among the remaining 
judges on the panel, ranging from 0 to 2. For the second regression, 
we substituted the “common space” measures of judicial ideology for 
party of appointing president: the independent variables were the 
voting judge’s own common space score, and the sum of the common 
space scores of the judge’s two colleagues. The third regression, in 
which we estimated Fischman’s consensus voting model, was 
considerably more complex, as it called for the estimation of almost 
eighty parameters, including the asylum voting proclivities of most 
judges in the Ninth Circuit. 
Table 2 presents the results of the first two regressions. The first 
column reports the results of the regression in which party of 
appointment was used as a proxy for the ideology of both the voting 
judge and the other judges on the panel. The second column reports 
the results of the regression in which the judicial common space 
scores were used in lieu of appointing party. In both regressions, both 
the ideology measures for the voting judge and for the other judges 
on the panel are statistically significant at the p ≤ .01 level. The 
estimated effects are also in the expected direction. Being a 
Democratic appointee, and having panel colleagues who are 
Democratic appointees, increase the likelihood of a pro-asylum vote. 
Likewise, the common space scores correspond as expected to the 
voting behavior of the judges: liberal judges, as measured by the 
common space scores, are more likely to favor asylum relief than 
conservative ones. The estimates from both regressions suggest that 
45% of the ideological component of a judge’s vote is determined by 
 
 193. See POSNER, supra note 15, at 32–34; see also SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 103, at 
64–71 (providing several alternative explanations for panel composition effects). 
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the judge’s own ideology and 55% is determined by the ideology of 
the other two judges.  
The common space scores do a slightly better job of explaining 
how the judges voted, as measured by the log-likelihood and pseudo-
R2 goodness-of-fit statistics for each regression, but the difference is 
very small. Moreover, the pseudo-R2 for both models is relatively 
low, which suggests that ideology—at least, as measured by these 
proxy variables—explains only a small proportion of the variation in 
voting. By comparison, the pseudo-R2 for Fischman’s consensus 
voting model is dramatically greater, which is to say that it is much 
better at explaining the voting behavior of the judges.194 This is only 
to be expected, however, given that it employs a vastly greater 
number of explanatory variables.195 
TABLE 2: EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF  
A PRO-ASYLUM VOTE 
 
Party of 
appointment 
Common space 
scores 
Democratic appointee 1.63**  
Number of colleagues 
who are Democratic 
appointees 1.00**  
Common space score  -2.49** 
 
 194. Fischman’s model, which estimates the ideology of the judges individually, yields a 
pseudo-R2 of 0.324 compared to 0.061 and 0.067 for the party and common space models, 
respectively. However, these statistics are not directly comparable, as the third model contains 
seventy-nine independent variables, as opposed to only three independent variables in each of 
the proxy-based models. 
 195. Fischman’s consensus voting model includes a parameter for each judge–whether 
active, senior, or sitting by designation–who participated in at least ten asylum cases in the 
Ninth Circuit between 1992 and 2001. There were sixty-five parameters of this type in total. In 
addition, the model includes two parameters that capture the average ideology of Democratic 
and Republican appointees who participated in fewer than ten cases; one parameter representing 
the ideological variance within these groups; one parameter that reflects the “cost of dissent”; 
and a parameter to represent the variance of the case-specific random effect. Thus, the model 
employs a total of seventy-nine independent variables, whereas each of the proxy-based models 
employs only three independent variables. 
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Party of 
appointment 
Common space 
scores 
Sum of colleagues’ 
common space scores  -1.55** 
Constant -4.74** -2.98** 
Goodness of fit statistics:   
Log likelihood -1398.28 -1389.48 
Pseudo-R2 0.061 0.067 
** denotes statistical significance at the p ≤ .01 level 
 
Although log-likelihood and pseudo-R2 statistics are widely used 
measures of goodness-of-fit, they are not easy to interpret in practical 
terms. A more intuitive way to assess the extent to which the three 
types of ideology measures fit the data is to speak in terms of 
predicted probabilities. Each type of ideology measure can be used to 
predict the probability that a particular vote will be pro-asylum. 
Accordingly, we calculated these predicted probabilities for each vote 
in the data using each type of ideology measure. We then compared 
the average predicted probability of a pro-asylum vote in all instances 
when a judge actually cast a pro-asylum vote, against the average 
predicted probability of a pro-asylum vote in all instances when a 
judge actually cast an anti-asylum vote. The difference between these 
two averages is a measure of goodness-of-fit known as “lambda.”196 
The larger the value of lambda for a particular measure of ideology, 
the greater the portion of the variation in voting behavior that can be 
explained by that measure.  
For each vote in the data that was actually cast in favor of asylum, 
the party of appointment measure yielded, on average, a 21.8% 
predicted probability of a pro-asylum vote. By contrast, for each vote 
 
 196. See J.S. Cramer, Predictive Performance of the Binary Logit Model in Unbalanced 
Samples, 48 STATISTICIAN 85, 88 (1999). The “lambda” statistic is appropriate for assessing the 
goodness-of-fit of models with dichotomous outcomes and is especially helpful when one 
outcome—in this case, anti-asylum votes—are much more common than the other. See id. 
Another commonly used measure, the percentage of votes correctly predicted, can be 
misleading in such situations. Id. at 91–92. 
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in the data that was actually cast against asylum, the party of 
appointment measure yielded, on average, a 16.4% predicted 
probability of a pro-asylum vote. The lambda goodness-of-fit statistic 
for the party-of-appointment measure was therefore 5.4%. For the 
common space scores, the corresponding lambda statistic was a 
somewhat better 6.3%. The ideology measures based upon 
Fischman’s consensus voting model, however, proved far superior at 
distinguishing between pro-asylum votes and anti-asylum votes: pro-
asylum votes had a 35.7% average predicted probability of being pro-
asylum, while the anti-asylum votes had only a 14.2% average 
predicted probability of being pro-asylum, with a resulting lambda of 
21.5%. 
3. The Extent to Which Proxy Measures Understate the Impact of 
Ideology 
It is not surprising that Fischman’s implementation of the 
behavioral-assessment approach does a much better job of explaining 
the votes in the data, given that it is much more complex than either 
of the proxy models.197 Our goodness-of-fit comparisons do 
highlight, however, a bona fide strength of behavioral measures: 
unlike proxy-based approaches, an approach that turns upon 
examination of each judge’s behavior does not tend to understate the 
impact of ideology on judicial behavior. Proxy measures such as 
appointing party and common space scores are inherently imprecise 
and cannot fully capture the ideological voting patterns that actually 
exist in the data. The lambda statistic calculated above in Part IV.A.2 
is merely one way of describing the extent to which they fall short in 
this regard.  
Another way to illustrate the extent to which the proxy measures 
fail to capture the full impact of ideology on voting is to compare, 
under each approach, the predicted difference in judicial behavior 
between a liberal voting scenario and a conservative voting scenario. 
In other words: what is the difference under each approach between 
the likelihood that a liberal judge paired with like-minded colleagues 
will cast a pro-asylum vote, and the likelihood that a conservative 
 
 197. See supra note 195 (discussing the number of parameters in each of the models). 
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judge paired with like-minded colleagues will cast a pro-asylum 
vote?  
In the case of the appointing party proxy, the difference is easy to 
see. Per Table 1, a Republican appointee sitting with two Republican 
appointees supports asylum relief only 6% of the time, while a 
Democratic appointee sitting with two Democratic appointees 
supports asylum relief 35% of the time. Thus, there is a 29% gap in 
the pro-asylum voting rate between a Republican judge on an all-
Republican panel and a Democratic judge on an all-Democratic 
panel. This gap represents the impact of ideology, as measured by 
party of appointment: 29% of voting in asylum cases hinges upon the 
appointing party of the judge and his or her colleagues. The 
simplicity of this analysis illustrates an important respect in which 
party of appointment shines as a measure of ideology: it produces 
results that require little effort to interpret. Moreover, it does so 
without any need for regression analysis or calculation of predicted 
probabilities and, if our goodness-of-fit tests are to be believed, at 
little cost in accuracy over a more complex proxy measure such as 
the common space scores. 
To obtain comparable predictions from the common space and 
behavioral measures, we must again calculate predicted probabilities. 
Specifically, for each vote in the data, we use each of the two 
measures to calculate the predicted probability that the judge in 
question would vote in favor of asylum. The predicted probabilities 
for each judge may then be ranked, from the lowest (reflecting the 
behavior of a conservative judge paired with conservative colleagues) 
to the highest (reflecting the behavior of a liberal judge paired with 
liberal colleagues).  
The results of this analysis, applied to each of the three methods 
for measuring ideology, are shown in Table 3, with probabilities 
arranged by percentile. When we calculate these probabilities using a 
model that employs the common space scores, we find that the judge 
at the 5th percentile, or conservative end, of this spectrum is only 6% 
likely to cast a pro-asylum vote, whereas the judge at the 95th 
percentile, the liberal end of the spectrum, has a 35% chance of 
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casting a pro-asylum vote.198 This range in pro-asylum voting rates is 
almost identical to the range observed when we simply compare all-
Republican panels with all-Democratic panels.199 The behavioral-
assessment model, however, reveals a much larger role for ideology 
than does either the common space score regression or a simple 
appointing-party analysis. According to this model, the difference 
between the 5th percentile and the 95th percentile is the difference 
between a 1% likelihood of a pro-asylum vote and a 57% likelihood 
of a pro-asylum vote. In other words, judicial voting is being driven 
by ideology over half of the time.  
TABLE 3: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A PRO-ASYLUM VOTE, 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER PANEL MEMBERS 
Probability of  
pro-asylum vote 
Appointing 
party 
Common 
space score 
Behavioral 
assessment 
    
5th percentile 6% 5% 1% 
Median 15% 16% 11% 
95th percentile 35% 35% 57% 
 
4. The Mixed Performance of the Common Space Scores 
Although there has been much debate about the relative merits of 
common space scores as opposed to party of appointment as 
measures of judicial ideology,200 Table 3 suggests that the 
 
 198. We compare the 5th and 95th percentile, rather than the minimum and maximum, in 
order to reduce sensitivity to outliers.  
 199. Yet another approach would be to use the regression coefficients from Table 2 to 
calculate the range in voting rates using the party variable, but the results would still be 
unchanged. The 5th percentile judge in the data would be a Republican appointee on an all-
Republican panel, and would have a 6% predicted pro-asylum voting rate. The 95th percentile 
judge would be a Democratic appointee on an all-Democratic panel and would have a 35% 
predicted pro-asylum voting rate. These predictions correspond exactly with the estimates 
derived from Table 2. According to the party proxy, the judge with the median voting 
probability would be a Democratic appointee sitting with two Republican colleagues. 
 200. Compare Epstein & King, supra note 113, at 83–84, 95–96 (favoring common space 
scores), and Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191, 203 n.27 (2002) 
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performance differences between these two proxy measures are quite 
small in practice. Common space scores provide a better fit to the 
asylum voting data than party of appointment, but the difference is 
slight. Both measures yield almost identical estimates of the impact 
of ideology on how judges vote. The much larger discrepancy is 
between the two proxy methods, on the one hand, and the behavioral-
assessment approach, on the other. It is the measurement error 
inherent in the proxy measures that explains both the vastly inferior 
fit of the proxy-based models and the fact that such models 
substantially underestimate the impact of ideology. 
Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of the measurement problems 
associated with the common space scores. For each judge, we used 
Fischman’s consensus voting model to estimate the probability that 
he or she would prefer to vote in favor of asylum in a random case.201 
Figure 1 plots each judge’s estimated probability of preferring the 
pro-asylum outcome against the judge’s common space score.202 The 
overall correlation between the estimated probabilities and the 
common space scores is 0.56. Although this correlation is statistically 
significant, the scatterplot highlights how the common space scores 
do a poor job of capturing the ideology of many judges whose 
estimated voting behavior departs dramatically from what their 
common space scores would suggest: some judges with similar or 
even identical common space scores nevertheless have very different 
estimated probabilities of voting in favor of asylum.  
To some extent, these disparities reflect inaccuracies in the 
behavioral estimates as well as flaws in the common space scores. 
We believe that the crux of the problem lies, however, in the common 
space scores. The scatterplot merely confirms problems in the 
 
(same), with Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 191, 203 n.27 (2002) (defending use of party of appointing president), and Richard L. 
Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169, 180–83 (2002) 
(same). 
 201. The probability that a judge prefers the pro-asylum outcome is the rate at which the 
judge would vote in favor of asylum if she were to vote sincerely. Because our model accounts 
for the fact that judges do not always vote sincerely, but are instead influenced by their panel 
colleagues, this probability will differ from a judge’s actual pro-asylum voting rate. Panel 
composition effects are discussed above at notes 38–44 and accompanying text. 
 202. Because a judge’s ideology cannot be estimated precisely from a small number of 
votes, Figure 1 includes only judges who cast at least fifty votes in the data. 
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common space scores that are obvious without any resort to estimated 
voting probabilities. For example, Judge Noonan, a Reagan 
appointee, has a very conservative common space score, yet he is in 
fact one of the most liberal judges on the Ninth Circuit in the area of 
asylum, judged either by his raw voting record–which “place[s] him 
among a handful of liberal Carter appointees”203–or by the 61% rate 
of favoring asylum claimants that the model predicts for him.204 
Conversely, Judge Farris is a Carter appointee with a very liberal 
common space score, yet he has in fact compiled an extremely 
conservative voting record in asylum cases,205 and the model predicts 
that he would favor asylum claimants only 2% of the time. 
FIGURE 1: ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF A JUDGE FAVORING THE 
ASYLUM CLAIMANT, COMPARED TO HIS OR HER COMMON SPACE 
SCORES206 
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 203. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking, supra note 185, at 851–52, 852 fig.8. 
 204. See id. at 851–52 & 852 fig.8. 
 205. See id. at 852 fig.8. 
 206. Figure 1 includes only judges with at least fifty votes in the data. The predicted 
probability of a pro-asylum vote is derived from the voting data using Fischman’s consensus 
voting model. The downward-sloping line is the best-fit line; it is the line that provides the best 
possible fit to the data, in the sense that it minimizes the sum of squared errors. 
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One might attempt to explain the poor performance of the 
common space scores in this context on the ground that asylum cases 
are somehow atypical of the kinds of cases that divide judges 
ideologically. On this view, Judge Noonan’s scores might do a better 
job of capturing his ideological leanings in, say, employment 
discrimination cases than in asylum cases. This is simply another way 
of saying that judicial ideology may be multidimensional: judges who 
may be conservative in other contexts may not be conservative in the 
context of asylum, and vice versa.207  
There is little evidence, however, that common space scores do a 
better job of explaining how judges behave in other types of cases. 
Their use has been justified primarily on theoretical grounds, rather 
than on the basis of any practical demonstration that they explain 
judicial behavior well in any specific area of law.208 There have been 
few other empirical tests of common space scores, and the results 
have been decidedly mixed. In a study of religious freedom cases 
decided by the lower federal courts, the common space scores barely 
outperformed party of appointing president in the context of 
Establishment Clause cases.209 These results were reversed, 
moreover, when it came to a substantial category of Free Exercise 
Clause cases, with party of appointing president slightly 
outperforming the common space scores.210 Similarly, in a recent 
study of sex discrimination cases decided by the federal courts of 
appeals, common space scores provided a slightly worse fit than 
party of appointing president, although it appears unlikely that the 
difference was statistically significant.211  
 
 207. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that an agnostically coded measure 
of judicial ideology may not accurately capture ideology in every area of law if the content of a 
judge’s ideological preferences varies from one area of law to another). As discussed above in 
Parts III.A.1 and III.B.2, behavioral assessment avoids this problem entirely, if the data are 
limited to a narrow area of law. 
 208. See Epstein & King, supra note 113, at 95–96. 
 209. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 94, at 789 & n.266–67. 
 210. See id. (noting that party of appointing president performed slightly better in the 
context of Free Exercise Clause litigation in educational settings). 
 211. See Boyd et al., supra note 92, at 44 tbl.3, 45 tbl.4 (reporting log-likelihood levels that 
indicate party of appointing president provided slightly better fit than common space scores 
when employed in a logistic regression model of judicial voting in published sex discrimination 
cases decided by the federal courts of appeals); E-mail from Christina L. Boyd, Ph.D. 
Candidate, Washington University in St. Louis, to the authors (Apr. 20, 2009, 12:21 EST) (on 
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The sparse and inconsistent track record of the common space 
scores illustrates an unfortunate fact: too little is known about the 
actual performance of various measures of ideology across different 
areas of law. To the extent that certain measures may perform well in 
certain applications, further research will be necessary to identify 
those applications. 
5. A Summary of the Relevant Tradeoffs 
In sum, no measurement approach is ideal in all respects. Yet the 
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches may not always be 
obvious. In our own tests, the oldest and humblest of measures—
namely, party of appointing president—proved surprisingly robust 
against a more sophisticated competitor. Contrary to claims that 
common space scores constitute a superior measure of judicial 
ideology,212 we found that such scores performed little better at 
explaining the data than party of appointment. The two proxy 
measures also yield practically identical estimates of the impact of 
ideology on judicial voting. At the same time, measurements and 
estimates that rely upon party of appointment have the added 
advantage of being easy to interpret. Behavioral assessment, in turn, 
produces ideology measurements that perform much better at 
explaining judicial voting than either party of appointment or 
common space scores. Compared to the other two approaches, it also 
does a better job of capturing the full impact of ideology on judicial 
behavior.  
The behavioral-assessment approach, however, is often 
substantially more difficult to implement. Nor will its advantages 
always be relevant as a practical matter: the additional statistical 
power that it offers will not always make the difference between 
accepting or rejecting a hypothesis. For purposes of testing certain 
basic hypotheses—for instance, that the ideology of each and every 
judge on the panel has a statistically significant impact on how any 
given member of the panel will vote—all three approaches are likely 
 
file with the authors) (confirming that the “party variable employed in the regressions refers to 
party of appointing president).  
 212. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 113, at 95–96. 
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to yield results of overwhelming statistical significance. In such 
cases, simpler may indeed be better. 
B. How Different Methods Perform When Applied to the Supreme 
Court 
Empirical research on the Supreme Court presents unique 
challenges due to the relatively small number of Justices and the 
unique nature of its docket. The composition of the Court can remain 
stable for long periods, and yet individual Justices may undergo 
ideological drift over their careers.213 The Supreme Court hears a 
disproportionately large share of high-profile and “difficult” cases, 
but scholars have thus far had little success in quantifying either the 
legal character of these cases or the substantive criteria for granting 
certiorari. Nevertheless, the Court has long been the subject of 
intensive empirical study, and scholars have devised a variety of 
ways to measure the ideology of its members. 
The simplest measure is, once again, party of appointing 
president: Democratic appointees are presumed to be more liberal 
than Republican appointees. Although party of appointment was 
employed in some of the earliest empirical studies of the Supreme 
Court, it is now seldom used, presumably due to the availability of 
superior measures. The Segal-Cover scores, another commonly used 
measure, are derived from an analysis of newspaper editorials written 
about each Justice in the prelude to his or her appointment.214 Once 
the dominant measure of Supreme Court ideology, they have ceded 
that position to the Martin-Quinn scores, which use cutting-edge 
techniques to estimate the “ideal points” of the Justices from their 
voting behavior in actual cases.215  
We set out to compare the explanatory power of these measures 
using decisions drawn from five issue areas: criminal procedure, 
economic activity, the First Amendment, civil liberties other than 
those found in the First Amendment, and judicial power. Data on the 
 
 213. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Segal & Cover, supra note 61, at 560; see also supra notes 119–21 and 
accompanying text. 
 215. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 32; see also supra notes 159–64 and accompanying 
text. 
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relevant cases was obtained from the Supreme Court database 
compiled by Harold Spaeth, which includes every Supreme Court 
case decided on the merits from 1953 through 2006.216 The ideology 
measures that we tested included not only party of appointment, the 
Segal-Cover scores, and the Martin-Quinn scores, but also a 
behavioral-assessment measure of our own devising. For each of the 
five areas of law at issue, we estimated the ideology of each Justice 
on the basis of his or her voting record in that particular area.217 In the 
area of criminal procedure, an abundance of data enabled us to 
estimate for each Justice not only an ideology score, but also a linear 
time trend parameter that provides some indication of the extent and 
direction of the Justice’s ideological movement over time.218 
We then evaluated the performance of the four measurement 
approaches at issue by performing a series of regressions. In each 
regression, the dependent variable was the ideological direction of a 
Justice’s vote in a case, as coded in the Spaeth database.219 In the 
party of appointment, Segal-Cover, and Martin-Quinn regressions,220 
 
 216. An updated version of the database that includes cases decided since 2006 is available 
online. See Supreme Court Data, supra note 69. 
 217. This model is specified below in note 222. 
 218. The modified model that we employed for the criminal procedure cases is specified in 
note 222 below. 
 219. The coding of this variable and others like it in the Spaeth database has increasingly 
become the subject of scholarly criticism. See Edelman & Chen, supra note 63, at 306–07 
(criticizing the manner in which legal issues are coded in the Spaeth database); Shapiro, supra 
note 63, at 501 (arguing that scholars who wish to rely upon the variables relating to substantive 
law in the Spaeth database face two problems: “(1) the impossibility of knowing how many 
(and which) legal issues arise in a particular case and (2) the difficulty of using the Database to 
study the way different areas of law interact or affect each other”); Harvey, supra note 68, at 
21–22; Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 42 (criticizing, and seeking to correct, the Spaeth 
database’s coding of the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions). Although it is 
important to be cognizant of such criticisms, a degree of miscoding of judicial votes in the 
Spaeth database is probably of only limited relevance to the comparison that we perform in this 
Article, as there is no obvious reason to think that any miscoding will systematically favor one 
measurement approach over another. 
 220. The regressions of judicial voting on the Martin-Quinn scores raise a problem of 
endogeneity or “circularity,” as some scholars have called it. See supra notes 153–54, 175–77 
and accompanying text. The problem exists because the Martin-Quinn scores are being 
employed in a regression to predict a subset of the votes from which they were estimated in the 
first place. See supra notes 153–54, 175–77 and accompanying text. However, this criticism 
would apply to any use of the Martin-Quinn scores as a transplanted measure, which is 
precisely how the Martin-Quinn scores have typically been used in the empirical literature. 
Moreover, Martin and Quinn have themselves argued that endogeneity of this type is not of 
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the independent variables were the ideology measure and also, for the 
Segal-Cover and Martin-Quinn scores, a squared version of that same 
measure.221 Given the difficulties involved in controlling for the 
unique characteristics of each case before the Supreme Court, we 
employed a fixed-effects logit model for each of the regressions.222 
This type of regression model allows for the possibility that the 
Justices’ votes are influenced in a common manner by issues specific 
to the case, yet does not require us to quantify any details of the case 
itself. It does so by estimating the probability that each Justice will 
cast a liberal vote, conditional on the total number of liberal votes. 
For example, if a particular case is decided by a six-to-three margin 
in the liberal direction, the model estimates the impact of Justice’s 
ideology score on the probability that he or she will cast a liberal 
vote, in light of the fact that six liberal votes are being cast. Because 
this type of model cannot generate any inferences about the impact of 
ideology on voting when all Justices vote the same way, we included 
only non-unanimous decisions in our data. 
 
practical concern in many applications. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 176, at 2–3. The 
endogeneity problem would appear to be most severe when the Martin-Quinn scores are used to 
explain criminal procedure votes, which constitute 37% of the cases in the Spaeth database. 
 221. The use of a squared term is appropriate due to the possibility of differences in the 
nonlinear scale of each ideology measure. 
 222. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 116, at 491–92. The fixed-effects logit model used here 
differs from the random-effects probit model used in Part IV.A in that it does not rely on the 
assumption that cases are randomly assigned. Because the Supreme Court has a discretionary 
docket, the characteristics of cases selected for review will presumably vary with the ideologies 
of the Justices at the time that review is granted. 
 The regression on the Martin-Quinn scores, for example, takes the form:  
Pr(Liberal vote by Justice i in case n in Term t) = Λ(bIMQit + b2MQit2 + cn), 
where MQit represents the Martin-Quinn score for Justice i in Term t , cn is a case-specific fixed 
effect, b1 and b2 are coefficients to be estimated, and Λ denotes the logistic function,  
Λ(x) = 1 / (1 + e-x). The regressions on the Segal-Cover scores and party of appointment take 
the same form except that these ideology measures are static, and the party-of-appointment 
model omits the squared term. 
 The behavioral-assessment model for each issue area other than criminal procedure 
estimates a parameter xi for each Justice from the model: 
Pr(Liberal vote by Justice i in case n) = Λ(xi + cn). 
 The model used for the criminal procedure cases estimates an additional parameter, a 
Justice-specific linear time trend zi: 
Pr(Liberal vote by Justice i in case n in Term t) = Λ(xi + tzi + cn). 
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Although the measures that we are comparing here are all 
considered measures of judicial “ideology,” it bears repeating that 
they are fundamentally dissimilar at a conceptual level and thus may 
in fact be capturing different phenomena. The Martin-Quinn scores 
are derived from an agnostic voting model estimated over the entire 
range of cases decided by the Supreme Court. Thus, the regression of, 
say, criminal procedure votes on Martin-Quinn scores estimates the 
degree to which Justices who often vote with “liberal” Justices across 
all cases happen to favor defendants in criminal procedure cases 
specifically. By contrast, the Segal-Cover regression estimates the 
degree to which Justices who were identified as “liberal” by 
newspaper editorialists before their confirmation favor criminal 
defendants. The party proxy explains how much more likely 
Democratic appointees are to support defendants than Republican 
appointees. The behavioral model directly estimates each Justice’s 
propensity to support defendants. It only makes sense to compare 
these measures if we believe that they all capture the same underlying 
phenomenon—namely, a single dimension of ideological 
disagreement that helps to explain the voting behavior of the Justices 
across a broad range of cases. 
Not surprisingly, each ideology measure proved a statistically 
significant predictor of how the Justices voted in each of the three 
regressions. For the sake of simplicity and brevity, we do not report 
the regression coefficients, which are difficult to interpret due to the 
complexity of the models and the varying scales of the ideology 
measures. Instead, Table 4 reports for each regression the pseudo-R2 
statistic, a goodness-of-fit measure that reflects how well the 
predictors in each regression explained the voting decisions of the 
Justices. 
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TABLE 4: GOODNESS-OF-FIT FOR DIFFERENT IDEOLOGY 
MEASURES ACROSS DIFFERENT ISSUE AREAS 
 Pseudo-R2 for each measure, by area of law 
 
Criminal 
procedure 
Civil 
rights 
Economic 
activity 
First 
Amendment
Judicial 
power 
Behavorial assessment 0.61 0.50 0.22 0.53 0.20 
Martin-Quinn 0.61 0.53 0.17 0.44 0.17 
Segal-Cover 0.38 0.22 0.07 0.31 0.08 
Appointing party 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Number of non-
unanimous cases 1540 702 530 456 368 
In terms of explaining the voting choices of the Justices, it is clear 
that the Martin-Quinn scores and the behavioral measures are 
superior to the Segal-Cover scores, which are in turn a large 
improvement over the party-of-appointment proxy measure. The fit 
of the measures also varies substantially by issue area. On the whole, 
all of the ideology measures provide a better fit for criminal 
procedure, civil rights, and First Amendment cases than for economic 
and judicial power cases, which suggests that the ideological 
preferences of the Justices may be unidimensional across only some 
areas of law: the attitudes that cause Justices to vote liberally in both 
civil rights and criminal procedure cases, for example, may have less 
relevance to their behavior when it comes to economic or judicial 
power cases.  
The goodness-of-fit statistics alone do not convey a practical 
sense of the extent to which the Martin-Quinn scores outperform the 
Segal-Cover scores. Accordingly, Table 5 translates the regression 
results into a metric that is much easier to interpret: the probability of 
a liberal vote. Due to the computational challenges involved in 
estimating such probabilities, we limit ourselves to reporting the 
predicted probability that a given Justice would be among those 
casting a liberal vote in a criminal or economic case that is ultimately 
decided by a five-to-four margin in a conservative direction. 
Moreover, because the Martin-Quinn scores vary over time, we must 
calculate the probabilities as of a specific point in time. Accordingly, 
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our predictions are based on the Martin-Quinn scores for the 1999 
Term.223 For purposes of comparison, Table 5 also lists the actual 
proportion of liberal votes cast by each Justice in five-to-four 
conservative rulings over the period from 1994 until 2004. Given that 
there are only thirty-six actual cases that meet these criteria, however, 
these proportions are necessarily imprecise and should be interpreted 
with caution.224  
TABLE 5: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A LIBERAL VOTE IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES, 1999 TERM, CONDITIONAL ON A 5–4 
CONSERVATIVE OUTCOME 
 
Behavioral 
assessment Martin-Quinn Segal-Cover
Actual proportion 
of liberal votes, 
1994–2004 
Rehnquist 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.06 
Stevens 0.95 0.97 0.41 0.94 
O’Connor 0.22 0.23 0.59 0.06 
Scalia 0.11 0.08 0.13 0.11 
Kennedy 0.19 0.20 0.54 0.03 
Souter 0.79 0.75 0.50 0.92 
Thomas 0.08 0.08 0.30 0.06 
Ginsburg 0.85 0.85 0.71 0.97 
Breyer 0.74 0.70 0.63 0.86 
 
 
 223. We chose the 1999 Term because it is the midpoint of the 1994–2004 period, during 
which the composition of the Supreme Court remained stable. Because a Justice’s Segal-Cover 
score does not change over time, the predictions obtained from that regression are identical for 
all Terms in which the composition of the Court remained the same. By contrast, the Martin-
Quinn scores do vary over time, but we suspect that the predictions and goodness-of-fit 
measures that they yield would not vary dramatically over the 1994 to 2004 period. Calculation 
of those statistics for each year would, in any event, be computationally burdensome and 
beyond the scope of this Article. 
 224. Consider, for example, the fact that Justice Kennedy voted in favor of the defendant in 
only 3% of the criminal procedure cases that were decided by a five-to-four conservative vote 
during the period from 1994 to 2004. In other words, he voted in a liberal direction in only one 
out of the thirty-six cases that met this description. At the same time, however, he had a 12% 
pro-defendant voting rate in cases that were decided by a six-to-three conservative vote, and an 
11% pro-defendant voting rate in cases that were decided by an even more lopsided seven-to-
two conservative vote. These figures suggest that the extremely low proportion of liberal votes 
reported for Justice Kennedy in Table 5 may not be representative of his overall behavior. 
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The behavioral measure and the Martin-Quinn scores yield almost 
identical predictions of how likely each Justice is to vote liberally. 
Perhaps this is not surprising: the Martin-Quinn scores are 
themselves behavior-based estimates of the Justices’ ideologies, 
albeit derived from a different model and a broader set of cases. By 
contrast, however, the Segal-Cover scores frequently yield very 
different predictions from the Martin-Quinn scores. For example, the 
Segal-Cover scores predict that Justice Stevens will vote liberally 
only 41% of the time, compared to the 97% liberal voting rate 
predicted by the Martin-Quinn scores; likewise, whereas Justice 
Thomas has a predicted 30% liberal voting rate according to the 
Segal-Cover scores, the Martin-Quinn scores predict that he will vote 
liberally only 8% of the time. 
A quick glance at the actual voting records of the Justices suggests 
that the Martin-Quinn scores yield predictions that are more reliable 
than those generated from the Segal-Cover scores. If one compares 
the predicted probabilities from each model with the actual voting 
percentages reported in the last column of Table 5, it becomes 
apparent that the Martin-Quinn scores yield predictions that fall 
closer to the observed data for every Justice. Meanwhile, the 
predictions based upon the Segal-Cover scores are sometimes far off 
the mark. For example, Justice Stevens has an actual record of voting 
liberally 94% of the time in such cases, yet the Segal-Cover scores 
predict that he will vote liberally only 41% of the time.  
Table 6 mirrors Table 5, but in the context of economic cases: it 
reports the predicted probability that a given Justice will cast a liberal 
vote in an economic case that is ultimately decided by a five-to-four 
margin in a conservative direction, as of the 1999 Term. Once again, 
the behavioral measures and the Martin-Quinn scores yield almost 
identical results, but the Segal-Cover scores often produce divergent 
predictions. For instance, the Segal-Cover scores predict a liberal 
voting rate of 43% for Justice Stevens, whereas the Martin-Quinn 
scores predict a 90% liberal voting rate. In the context of economic 
cases, it is difficult to evaluate the performance of the three 
measurement approaches against the actual voting records of the 
Justices: the Court decided only eight economic cases from 1994 to 
2004 by a five-to-four conservative vote, which is simply too small a 
number to permit meaningful comparison. Given that the Segal-
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Cover scores provided substantially lower goodness-of-fit,225 
however, it is reasonable to infer that the Martin-Quinn scores and 
the behavioral approach to measuring ideology will yield more 
reliable predictions.  
TABLE 6: PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A LIBERAL VOTE IN 
ECONOMIC CASES, 1999 TERM, CONDITIONAL ON A 5–4 
CONSERVATIVE OUTCOME 
 Behavioral model Martin-Quinn Segal-Cover 
Rehnquist 0.17 0.23 0.26 
Stevens 0.87 0.90 0.43 
O’Connor 0.24 0.30 0.54 
Scalia 0.22 0.19 0.22 
Kennedy 0.35 0.28 0.51 
Souter 0.58 0.62 0.48 
Thomas 0.20 0.19 0.35 
Ginsburg 0.73 0.71 0.63 
Breyer 0.63 0.58 0.57 
 
In all of our regressions, the Martin-Quinn scores perform almost 
as well as the behavioral measures that we separately estimated for 
each area of law. They provide comparable goodness-of-fit in every 
area of law that we examined and yielded similar predictions for the 
voting behavior of each Justice in criminal procedure and economic 
cases. However, the behavioral-assessment approach still offers 
important advantages. Most significantly, it avoids the problem of 
circularity that is inherent whenever the Martin-Quinn scores are 
used to explain voting on the Supreme Court.226 It can also be used to 
test hypotheses that cannot be tested with the Martin-Quinn scores. 
Consider, for example, the question of whether Justice Ginsburg was 
more liberal than Justice Souter in economic cases as of 1999. Per 
Table 6, the results of the behavioral approach support the conclusion 
that she was indeed more liberal, and that the difference is 
 
 225. See supra Table 4. 
 226. See supra note 220. 
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statistically significant.227 However, this simple hypothesis cannot be 
tested using the results from the Martin-Quinn regression, because 
any regression that uses the Martin-Quinn scores is built on the 
assumption that the Martin-Quinn scores have correctly specified the 
ideological placement of the Justices relative to one another.228 
The Segal-Cover scores still have one advantage over both the 
Martin-Quinn scores and our own behavioral measures: because they 
are fixed at the time of appointment and do not depend at all upon the 
actual voting behavior of the Justices, they can be used in any kind of 
regression analysis without raising concerns of circularity. At the 
same time, they provide reasonable explanatory power across many, 
albeit not all, areas of law.229 This combination of virtues may help to 
explain their enduring popularity, even in sophisticated 
applications.230 Our results suggest, however, that the Segal-Cover 
scores may not be appropriate in applications that demand a high 
degree of measurement precision.  
CONCLUSION 
Not all measures of judicial ideology are created equal. This much 
is already widely suspected, if not known, among those who study 
judicial behavior empirically. Very little has been written, however, 
about which measures are better, to what extent, and for what 
purposes. This Article has sought to rectify this situation in two ways. 
First, we have identified the most pressing conceptual and 
methodological challenges involved in measuring judicial ideology. 
Second, we have sought to measure the measures themselves, by 
evaluating the relative performance of several popular approaches to 
measuring judicial ideology. Our findings confirm that different 
 
 227. Per a Wald test, the difference is statistically significant at the p = .10 level. 
 228. See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing how a behavioral-assessment 
approach to measuring judicial ideology can be better suited to testing certain types of 
hypotheses about judicial behavior); supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text (explaining 
that agnostically coded measures of judicial ideology, such as the Martin-Quinn scores, embody 
assumptions that may render them inappropriate for certain applications). 
 229. See supra Table 4 (reporting meaningful goodness-of-fit statistics for the Segal-Cover 
scores when used to predict judicial voting in the areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, and 
First Amendment law). 
 230. See Epstein et al., supra note 177, at 55–57, 90. 
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measures of ideology vary greatly in their ability to explain judicial 
voting, and that the choice of one measurement approach over 
another can significantly influence the findings that scholars reach. If 
empirical scholarship involving the concept of judicial ideology is to 
realize its scientific potential or gain greater acceptance from a wider 
audience, those of us who produce such scholarship must learn both 
to speak clearly about what is meant by “judicial ideology,” and to 
give careful thought to the methods that are employed to measure it. 
Because no measurement approach is ideal, it will inevitably be 
necessary for scholars to make tradeoffs and to sacrifice the 
advantages of one approach for the virtues of another according to 
the project at hand. But it is certainly possible to choose among the 
alternatives in an informed fashion. 
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